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In 1995, I published an article in the University of Pennsylva-
nia Journal of International Business Law entitled "Banking De-
regulation in Indonesia."1 In that article, I argued that the re-
forms made to the regulatory framework of the Indonesian
banking system since 19882 had left the banking sector in a pre-
* Vice President, Chase Securities Japan Ltd. This Article does not repre-
sent the views or opinions of Chase Securities. This Article contains state-
ments which are based on author's personal experience and knowledge gained
from dealings with Indonesian attorneys, bankers, and entities.
' Michael S. Bennett, Banking Deregulation in Indonesia, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L
BUS. L. 443 (1995).
2 In October 1988, Bank Indonesia enacted a package of banking reforms
known as PAKTO '88. Among other things, PAKTO '88 relaxed the restric-
tions on the establishment of private and foreign-owned banks, as well as those
restrictions on existing banks opening new branches. For a general description
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carious situation. In the interests of liberalizing the banking sys-
tem, the regulatory reforms had led to a proliferation of danger-
ously undercapitalized and poorly supervised banks. Although
the reform process had succeeded in transforming a static banking
sector, dominated by a small number of state owned banks, into a
more competitive system with over 230 banks by 1997, I argued
that the lack of effective prudential regulation and controls had
made the country susceptible to a significant and system-wide
banking crisis.
The concerns I expressed about the Indonesian banking sys-
tem in that article were neither uniquely my own, nor based on
pure speculation. By 1995, several Indonesian banks had experi-
enced scandals that constituted the first clear, empirical evidence
of the dangers faced by the Indonesian banking sector as a whole?
One such scandal that attracted wide scale attention was the col-
lapse of Bank Summa in 1992. At the time of Bank Summa's liq-
uidation, it was estimated that more than seventy percent of its
loan portfolio was non-performing and that a high percentage of
those loans had been made to affiliated companies.' In total, the
bank had amassed more than US$700 million in nonperforming
loans.'
Bank Summa was not a marginal participant in the banking
sector, and therefore its insolvency could not be dismissed as sim-
ply an aberration. This bank was one of the first wave of private
banks established after the enactment by Bank Indonesia6 of the
of PAKTO '88, see Deregulating Indonesia: It's the Banks' Turn, E. ASIAN
EXECUTIVE REP., Nov. 1988, at 9; see also Paving the Way for Growth,
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Nov. 29, 1992, at 2 (discussing the private sector's
strong response to sweeping deregulation).
3 See Peter Halesworth, Indonesia: Trade & Investment- Banking: Eliminat-
ing a Scourge, FAR E. ECON. REV. 62, May 18, 1995.
4 On the collapse of Bank Summa, see Tony Shale, Top-Level Shakeout
Needed to Mend the Financial System, EUROMONEY, June 1993, at 55 [hereinaf-
ter Top-Level Shakeout]; see also Richard Borsuk, Indonesia Bolsters Its Commit-
ment to Tight Rein on Credit, ASIAN WALL ST. J. WKLY., Jan. 24, 1994, at 17.
s See Top-Level Shakeout, supra note 4, at 55.
6 Bank Indonesia is Indonesia's central bank and is responsible for the im-
plementation of the government's monetary policies and the general supervi-
sion of the country's banks. For a general overview of the functions and or-
ganization of Bank Indonesia, see About BI (visited Jan. 20, 1999)
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1988 banking reforms.7 Prior to its collapse, Bank Summa was
one of the ten largest banks in Indonesia and was owned by the
Soeryadjaya family, who also maintained a controlling interest in
Astra International, one of Indonesia's largest conglomerates!
Moreover, the scandals in the Indonesian banking sector were
not limited to the private banks. Another case, which cast doubt
on the effectiveness of both Indonesia's banking regulators and its
prison officials, was an incident involving the government-owned
development bank, Bank Bapindo.9 In 1994, Bapindo lent ap-
proximately US$430 million to the Golden Key group, a then lit-
tle known Indonesian conglomerate owned by a businessman
named Eddy Tansil. ° The loan was never repaid and a later gov-
ernment investigation alleged that the loan had been extended
based on fraudulent documentation and with the complicity of
certain Bapindo executives and government officials."
Ultimately, Tansil and several Bapindo executives were con-
victed of fraud by an Indonesian court and sentenced to prison in
1995.12 Within a year of these convictions, however, the incident
returned to the headlines when Tansil escaped from prison, ap-
parently with the assistance of certain of his jailers. 3 Bapindo was
7 See Jack Lowenstein, Reaping the Rewards of Reform, EUROMONEY
SPECIAL SUPP., Dec. 1, 1989, at 2.
s At the time, Astra International was Indonesia's second largest company
by stock market capitalization. On the Soeryadjaya family's control of Bank
Summa and Astra International, see Suhaini Aznam, Father Knows Best, FAR E.
ECON. REV., June 25, 1992, at 62. The collapse of Bank Summa ultimately
caused the Soeryadjaya family to sell its controlling interest in Astra Interna-
tional. See Suhaini Aznam, Sold, at Last, FAR E. ECON. REV., Jan. 28, 1993, at
54.
' "Bapindo" is an acronym for the bank's name inBahasa Indonesia, Bank
Pembangunan Indonesia.
10 See, e.g., Golden Key Hole, ECONOMIST, Apr. 30, 1994, at 84; Victor Mal-
let, Top Bankers Held in $430M Scandal, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 19-20, 1994, at 4.
" Several high-ranking officials were implicated in the Golden Key scan-
dal, including former minister of finance Johannes Sumarlin, who at the time
was also a member of Bapindo's board of commissioners. Although Sumarlin
was never charged in connection with the incident, it was alleged that the letter
of credit was approved by Sumarlin based on the informal reference of several
other senior government officials. See Economy: Bapindo Scandal Highlights
Crisis in Banking Industry, Economist Intelligence Unit - Country Report, Aug.
5, 1994.
12 See Businessman Jailed for 17 Years over Indonesia's Biggest Fraud Case,
AGENCE FR.-PRESsE, Aug. 15, 1994,available in 1994 WL 9621345.
13 See Maggie Ford, Smoothing the Bumpy Road, EUROMONEY, Apr. 1997,
at 175 [hereinafter Smoothing the Bumpy Road]; see also Eddy Tansil, Figure at
1999]
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never fully recapitalized after the losses incurred in the Golden
Key scandal, which left it as one of the financially weakest of the
state-owned banks.
14
Bank Summa's collapse and the Golden Key scandal were just
two of the more visible incidents involving Indonesian banks that
called attention to the lack of effective banking regulation in the
country."5 These incidents showed that even banks owned, in one
case, by the government and, in another case, by one of the coun-
try's most powerful industrialist families, were capable of signifi-
cant mismanagement and were operating without effective inter-
nal or external controls.
The cracks that were already showing in Indonesia's banking
framework by 1995 became wide fissures under the stress of the
financial crisis that occurred throughout much of Asia beginning
in the Spring of 1997.16 Undercapitalized and, in large part, bur-
dened with poorly diversified and badly performing loan portfo-
lios, the vast majority of Indonesian banks were not in a position
to weather any kind of serious shock to the financial system.
And, the shocks that occurred in connection with the Asian fi-
Center of Bapindo Collapse, Escapes Jail, JAKARTA POST, May 8, 1996, at 1,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Allbbn File.
14 See Smoothing the Bumpy Road, supra note 13, at 176.
15 See Indonesia Closes Troubled Banks as Part of Economic Bailout, N.Y.
TIMEs ABSTRACTs, Nov. 2, 1997, at § 1, 1,available in 1997 WL 8010755.
16 The term "Asian financial crisis" will be used in this article to refer gen-
erally to the currency devaluations and negative capital flows that occurred
throughout Southeast Asia and South Korea beginning in the Summer of 1997.
Although a number of events that occurred in early 1997, including the bank-
ruptcy of the Hanbo Group in South Korea in January, could be considered to
be part of the crisis, the Asian financial crisis is frequently dated from mid-
May, 1997, when the Thai baht first was put under pressure from speculators
who sold the baht aggressively. Speculative attacks quickly followedon other
Asian currencies, including the Philippine peso, the Malaysian ringgit, the Ko-
rean won, the Singapore dollar, the Hong Kong dollar and the Indonesianru-
piah. On the Asian financial crisis generally, see Giancarlo Corsetti et al., Wbat
Caused the Asian Currency and Financial Crisis?, in Nouriel Roubini's Asia's
Economic and Currency Crisis (last visited Feb. 16, 1999) < http://www.stern.
nyu.edu/- nroubini/asia/asiahomepage.html> [hereinafter Asia Crisis Home-
page]; Paul Krugman, What Happened to Asia? (last visited Feb. 16, 1999)
<http://web.m .edu/krugmanfw/disinter.html>; Rudi Dornbusch, Asia
Crisis Themes, available in Asia Crisis Homepage, supra; Javad K. Shirazi, The
East Asian Crisis: Or ins, Policy Challenges and Prospects (last visited
Feb. 16, 1999) <http://www.worldbank.org/ html/ extdr/offrep /eap/jkssp
061098.htm>; Moris Goldstein, The Asian Financial Crisis (last modified Mar.
1998) <http://www.iie.com/news98-1.htm>; see also Martin Wolf, Ins and
Outs of Capital Flows, FIN. TiMES, June 16, 1998, at 25.
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nancial crisis, which included a rapid devaluation of the Indone-
sian rupiah against the U.S. dollar and most other major curren-
cies17 and a large scale withdrawal of foreign private capital,18 cer-
tainly constituted serious shocks to the system. The weaknesses
of the Indonesian banking sector made it very vulnerable to such
shocks.
The Asian financial crisis left the vast majority of Indonesian
banks insolvent and necessitated large scale intervention by the
Indonesian government to prevent a general collapse of the coun-
try's banking system. 9 The scale of the government's interven-
17 The Indonesian rupiah ("rupiah" or "IDR") first came under severe
pressure on August 13, 1997, when the ]DR fell to its then historic low of
2,682 against the U.S. dollar ("U.S. dollar" or"USD") before Bank Indonesia
intervention briefly halted the currency's decline. See Bank Indonesia Steps in
to Stop Rupiab Plunge, ABD( (Australasian News Abstracts), Aug. 14, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 18227634. The next day, the rupiah fell to 2,755 against
the U.S. dollar when the Indonesian government abolished the exchange rate
intervention band system and let the currency freely float against the U.S. dol-
lar. See Susan Sim, Indonesian Central Bank Ups Some Short-Term Interest Rates:
Rupiab and Baht Hit New Lows as Speculators Pile on Pressure, SINGAPORE
STRAITS TIMES, Aug. 20, 1997, available in 1997 WL 12143282. Since then, the
IDR-USD exchange rate has been very volatile. To illustrate the rupiah's vola-
tility against the U.S. dollar, the following are the closing spot rates on certain
random dates over the one year period following August 13, 1997: October 6,
1997: USD 1= IDR 3,705; December 9, 1997: USD 1 - IDR 4,550; January 1,
1998: USD 1 = IDR 5,450; January 28, 1998: USD 1 = IDR 12,500; February
16, 1998: USD 1 = IDR 9,950; June 17, 1998: USD 1 = IDR 16,150; July 31,
1998: USD 1 = IDR 13,300; and August 13, 1998: USD 1 = IDR 13,200.
Bloomberg News Service, Historical Price Traded Currency (search for Indo-
nesian Rupiah spot rate). See also Chronology of the Asian Currency Crisis and
its Global Contagion, available in Asia Crisis Homepage, supra note 16.
" Private capital flows to Indonesia from abroad, which (expressed as a
percentage of gross domestic product) had increased by 2.6% from 1995 to
1996, decreased by 6.1% from 1996 to 1997. See Shirazi, supra note 16. The
reverse of capital flows to Indonesia from a net positive to a net negative was
part of a general trend that occurred throughout Southeast Asia and South Ko-
rea during the Asian financial crisis. See Burton Malkiel & J.P. Mei, Contain-
ing Chernobyl, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1998. In the aggregate, private capital flows
to South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and The Philippines changed
from a US$93 billion inflow in 1996 to a US$12 billion outflow in 1997. See
id.
19 See, e.g., Dan Murphy, Bank Indonesia Figures Shows Banks on Life Sup-
port, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Mar. 3, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Allbbn File [hereinafter Banks on Life Support]. It is estimated that the Indone-
sian government injected approximately 141.6 trillion rupiah (roughly US$12
billion) into the country's banking system during the Asian financial crisis, in-
cluding approximately 50 trillion rupiah in January 1998 alone. See Dan Mur-
phy et al., Indonesia Detains 2 Bankers; Tries to Recoup $12 Bin, BLOOMBERG
NEWS, Sept. 11, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allbbn File [hereinaf-
1999]
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tion was unprecedented in Indonesia's financial history." Several
banks, for example, including the state-owned Bank Ekspor-
Impor, are reported to have received liquidity support from Bank
Indonesia in an aggregate amount equal to more than 500% of
their stated capital.2' The government's provision of liquidity
support to the banks contributed significantly to the rapid decline
in the level of the country's foreign exchange reserves.' This de-
cline in foreign reserves, combined with the country's high level
of external debt,' resulted in Indonesia needing substantial finan-
cial assistance from the International Monetary Fund, the Asian
Development Bank, and other sovereign and multi-national or-
ganization lenders.24
ter Indonesia Detains Two Bankers]; Maggie Ford, Waking Up to Reality,
EUROMONEY, May 1998, at 46 [hereinafter Waking Up]; Dan Murphy, Indone-
sian Broad Money Supply Surged 27 Percent in January, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Mar.
4, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allbbn File [hereinafter Money
Supply Surged]; Indonesian Banks: Tough Choices, ECONOMIST, July 18, 1998, at
64.
20 For example, Bank Indonesia injected 39 trillion rupiah into the banking
system during one period in early January 1998, as compared with 429 billion
rupiah during a period of similar length in July 1997 before the Asian financial
crisis. See Banks on Life Support, supra note 19.
21 See Govt's Bank Loan Converted into Equity, JAKARTA POST, Sept. 9,
1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Jkpost File.
Bank Indonesia figures showed that by March 1998 Indonesia's foreign
exchange reserves had fallen 43% after reaching their historical high of
US$28.85 billion in June 1997, immediately before the Asian financial crisis.
See Banks on Life Support, supra note 19.
' According to Bank Indonesia figures released on May 13, 1998, the In-
donesian public sector's total external debt as of February 28, 1998 was more
than US$65 billion. See RI Foreign Debt Drops to US$ 131.7 Billion BI,
JAKARTA POST, May 14, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Jkpost File.
This foreign debt burden ultimately required the Indonesian government to
undertake debt rescheduling negotiations with its international creditors. See
Debt Rescheduling Likely to Strengthen Indonesian Rupiah, ASIA PULSE, Sept. 28,
1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Apulse File. In September 1998, In-
donesia reached an agreement with its major international lenders to resched-
ule US$4.2 billion of its sovereign debt. See id. This agreement, which was
reached under the auspices of the so-called "Paris Club" of creditor nations,
involved rescheduling all sovereign debt due between August 6, 1998 and
March 31, 2000 for a period of between 11 and 20 years. See I. Made Sentana &
Alan R. Katz, Indonesia Wins Rolloverfor $4.2 Billion of Debt, ASIAN WALL ST.
J., Sept. 24, 1998, at 3; Sander Thoenes, Jakarta $4.2Bn Debt Deals, FIN. TIMES,
Sept. 24, 1998, at 6; Bank Indonesia, Rescheduling/Refinancing of Principal In-
stallments of Government Debt Under Paris Club, Oct. 7, 1998, in Bank Indone-
sia Homepage, supra note 6.
24 In total, sovereign and multi-national organization lenders pledged ap-




Despite the size of the intervention, the government's injec-
tion of funds into the country's banks in the wake of the Asian
financial crisis did not amount to a much needed recapitalization
of the banking system. Rather, the intervention was simply a
stop-gap measure to maintain minimum levels of banking sector
liquidity. The funds were used by the banks to meet their imme-
diate liquidity needs and therefore the intervention, although suc-
cessful to the extent of preventing a total system-wide collapse,
did not leave the banking system in a materially stronger position
that would enable it to move forward. The government's actions
were, in other words, simply a band-aid rather than a cure.
Even the band-aid of massive government intervention was
not sufficient, however, to alleviate the bleeding in much of the
banking sector. When the provision of liquidity support alone
proved to be insufficient to maintain overall bank solvency, the
Indonesian government began taking more direct and severe ac-
tion. In November 1997, the Ministry of Finance ordered the
liquidation of sixteen private banks.2" At the same time, the gov-
ernment began assuming control over banks which had run up
extremely large negative balances with Bank Indonesia. By Octo-
International Monetary Fund, with the distribution of such aid conditioned on
Indonesia undertaking a variety of reforms. For the text of the Memorandum
of Economic and Financial Policies between the International Monetary Fund
and the Government of Indonesia see Indonesia- Memorandum of Economic
and Financial Policies (last visited Feb. 17, 1999) <http:// www.imf. org
/external/np/LOI/01 1598.htm> [hereinafter IMF Homepage]. See, e.g., David
E. Sanger, After Compromises, Indonesians Reach 3d Pact With LM.F, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 8, 1998, at Al; see also Dan Murphy, Asian Development Bank to
Lend Indonesia $3.5 Billion, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Oct. 31, 1997, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Allbbn File [hereinafter Asian Development Bank]. On
the changing attitudes of Indonesian officials with respect to international fi-
nancial aid, see Jay Solomon, Wavering Hopes: Jakarta Questions Reliance on
IMFand World Bank, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 1998, at 1. Separate from the
International Monetary Fund led program, the Islamic Development Bank
pledged US$600 million of assistance to Indonesia in September 1998. See Sa-
brine Hassen, Islamic Development Bank to Allocate $600 Million to Indonesia,
SeFt. 13, 1998, BLOOMBERG NEWS, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allbbn
s The liquidated banks were: Bank Harapan Sentosa, Sejahtera Bank
Umum, Bank Andromeda, Bank Pacific, Bank Astria Raya, Bank Guna Inter-
nasional, Bank Dwipa Semesta, Bank Kosagraha Semesta, Bank Industri, Bank
Jakarta, Bank Citrahasta Dhanamanunggal, South East Asia Bank, Bank Mata-
ram Dhanarta, Bank Pinaesaan, Bank Anrico, and Bank Umum Majapahit
Jaya. See List of 16 Indonesian Banks Closed, Liquidated from Nov. 1,
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Nov. 1, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allbbn
File [hereinafter List of 16 Banks].
1999]
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ber 1998, the government ordered the liquidation of another ten
banks26 and controlled approximately seventy percent of the total
assets in the Indonesian banking system.27 As these figures sug-
gest, the Asian financial crisis left most of Indonesia's more than
200 banks as virtual wards of the state, with their solvency de-
pendent entirely on government support."
In my 1995 article, I summarized the regulatory framework of
the Indonesian banking industry, focusing on the principal laws
and regulators.29 I then traced the history of the government's
deregulation efforts and questioned the wisdom of those efforts
based on the weak financial condition of the majority of the
country's banks.30 Finally, I attempted to place Indonesia's bank-
ing reforms in the context of similar banking deregulation pro-
grams implemented in Southeast Asia and argued that Indonesia's
reforms were materially different from the efforts of its neighbors
both because of the accelerated pace of the reforms and the weak-
ened position in which the reforms had left the country's banks. 1
The purpose of this article is to re-examine Indonesia's deregu-
lation of its banking system in light of the Asian financial crisis.
Although I will discuss capital flows, interest rate changes, and
other economic issues, this article is not intended to be an in-
depth economic analysis of the financial crisis itself. Rather, it is
primarily a legal analysis of a regulatory system and the relation-
ship of that system to certain economic events. First, I will look
at the impact of the Asian financial crisis on the Indonesian bank-
ing sector. Next, I will examine how the banking deregulation
26 See, e.g., Uncertainty Looms Over Indonesian Banks, INT'L FINANCING
REV., Aug. 29, 1998, at 42; OxfordAnalytica Ltd., Indonesia: Bank Repayments
(last modified Sept. 28, 1998) < http://www.oxan.com/asia07.html > [herein-
after Indonesia: Bank Repayments]; Sri Mulyani Indrawati & Ali Wardono, In-
donesian Economic Reconstruction: Where Do We Start?, Speech at the Over-
coming the Current Economic Downturn Conference (Aug. 23, 1998) in
<http://www.indoexchange.com> [hereinafter Indonesia Exchange Home-
page].
27 See Indonesia Weighs Pumping More Money into Banks, Sabirin Says,
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Aug. 19, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allbbn
File (indicating that "[r]oughly 70 percent of the assets in the banking system
were under government control).
28 See Uncertainty Looms Over Indonesian Banks, supra note 26 (discussing
the degree of governmental control over its banks).
29 See Bennett, supra note 1, at 449-53.
30 See id. at 454-70.
31 See id. at 470-81.
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program pursued by the Indonesian government since 1983, and
in particular since the reforms enacted in 1988, left the banking
sector vulnerable to a system-wide collapse. Finally, I will review
the efforts made by the government to control the banking col-
lapse and to begin to rebuild the banking sector in the wake of
the Asian financial crisis.
2. THE IMPACT OF THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS ON
INDoNESIAN BANKS
A properly functioning banking system is an essential part of
a nation's economic well-being. Because banks serve as allocators
of capital as well as protectors of the national payment system,
their importance to a country's economic infrastructure goes far
beyond their contribution to the gross national product. The
presence of financially secure banks is also important for main-
taining public confidence in the economy. Bank failures under-
mine that confidence and thus have negative consequences for a
country's economy that often are disproportionately large com-
pared to the actual harm done to the failed bank's depositors,
borrowers and other constituents." Such negative consequences
can include reduced consumption and investment, as both indi-
viduals and companies curtail their spending out of concerns
about the country's economic future.
One measure of the health of a country's banking system is
the ability of the system to withstand periods of unusually high
levels of economic distress. By this standard, as well as several
others, the Indonesian banking system receives very poor marks.
The Asian financial crisis substantially decimated Indonesia's
overbanked33 and undercapitalized banking sector, exposing the
core weaknesses of the system that were less evident in earlier
32 For a brief, but informative, description of the dangers posed by bank
failures, see Please, Governor, Can You Spare a Billion?, ECONOMIST, Mar. 25,
1995, at 79.
"' Although no accurate formula exists for determining the optimal num-
ber of banks in any country, a comparison of the number of banks in Indone-
sia with the aggregate amount of assets in the banking system suggests that, by
international standards, Indonesia had an unusually large number of banks for
the total asset size of its bank market. See Standard & Poor's, Indonesian Banks
Survive Ongoing Stress, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Nov. 8, 1995, available in Bloom-
berg News Service [hereinafter Standard & Poor's Creditwire Report on Indo-
nesia].
1999]
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years when general growth throughout the Indonesian economy
buoyed bank profits. 4
One reason for the Indonesian banking system's vulnerability
to the effects of the Asian financial crisis was that the loan portfo-
lios of most of its banks concentrated in loans made to the real es-
tate sector. Bank Indonesia's own figures show that bank lending
to the property sector increased by nearly forty percent from
1995 to 1996.35 By late 1997, analysts estimated that the property
sector received twenty-five percent of all bank loans.36 Even these
figures most likely understate the degree of exposure that Indone-
sian banks had to the real estate market. Private banks lent much
property to affiliated property companies and may have underre-
ported to avoid sanctions for violating the affiliated lending limits
imposed by the Banking Law.37
Large-scale exposure to property companies became a serious
problem for Indonesian banks by the time of the Asian financial
crisis because highly speculative overbuilding, particularly in the
Jakarta area, occurred in the Indonesian property sector through-
out the 1990's.38 The easy availability of bank credit in part fu-
"4 Gross domestic product ("GDP") growth in Indonesia averaged roughly
seven percent per year from 1967, when Suharto took over the presidency, un-
til 1997. See Indonesia: The Long March, ECONOMIST, Apr. 17, 1993, at 3, 3.
GDP growth slowed to 5.7% in 1997, reflecting the onset of the Asian financial
crisis, and as of late 1998, many analysts forecasted GDP growth to be a nega-
tive 15 to 20% in 1998. See Grainne Mccarthy, Indonesia's GDP Shrank by
174% in Third Quarter, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 1998, at 3.
See J. Soedradjad Djiwandono, The Banking Industry Facing the 21"
Century (visited Jan. 20, 1999) <http://www.bi.go.id/intl/speeches/century.
htm> [hereinafter Banking Industry].
36 See Maggie Ford, Now Comes the Real Crisis, EuROMONEY, Dec. 1997, at
44, 45 [hereinafter Real Crisis].
" See Banking Law, Law No. 7 of 1992; Real Crisis, supra note 36, at 45
(estimating that as much as US$15 billion of Indonesian bank lending may
have gone unrecorded). The affiliate lending restrictions limited the aggregate
amount that could be lent to affiliated companies to 20% of a bank's capital.
Many of the private banks are believed to have substantially violated those re-
strictions. See Indonesia: Bank Repayments, supra note 26 (stating that 16 of the
24 liquidated banks allegedly violated the legally defined limits on lending ac-
tivities). Bank Modern, for example, admitted after the government shut it
down in August 1998 that it lent 65% of its capital to affiliates in the Modern
Group. See Alistair Hammond, Indonesia's Modern Group to Repay 2.1 TIn Ru-
piah in Govt Debt, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Sept. 11, 1998, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Allbbn File.
38 See, e.g., Asian Property: Situations Vacant, ECONOMIST, Apr. 12, 1997, at
72, 72 (stating that Jakarta had vacancy rates of 13.7% and climbing); Richard




eled this overbuilding. By one estimate, bank loans accounted for
95% of the financing for property development in Indonesia.39
Even as the glut in the property market became apparent and
real estate prices began to decline, Indonesian banks continued to
lend aggressively to property companies. In 1997, for example,
despite large-scale losses being reported by the property indus-
try,4" Indonesian bank lending to the property sector totaled ap-
proximately 19.4 trillion rupiah, a 21% increase from 1996.41 As
interest rates rose and property prices and occupancy rates de-
clined in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, new construction
activity ceased almost entirely, and the income -from existing
properties contracted as increasing numbers of retail and other
commercial tenants either went out of business or moved to less
expensive space.42
The deteriorating property market caused large numbers of
property companies to default on their loans.43 In some cases,
banks had taken a pledge over property as collateral for such
loans.' However, the insolvency laws and regulations and other
Oct. 20, 1994, at 4 (forecasting bad debts due to a glut in property projects);
Henny Sender, Space Race: Jakarta's Real-Estate Market Headed for Trouble?,
FAR E. ECON. REV., Aug. 4, 1994, at 56, 56 (questioning aggressive practices in
an oversupplied market).
'9 Because of the high level of exposure that Indonesian banks had to the
property sector, the government attempted to curb bank funding for property
projects immediately prior to the Asian financial crisis. In July 1997, Bank In-
donesia issued a decree that was intended to severely restrict bank credit to real
estate developers. See Decree of the Board of Directors of Bank Indonesia on the
Limitation for Credits Provided by Public Banks for the Financing of Provisioning
and or Processing of Land (visited Jan. 20, 1999) <http: /www.bi.go.id/
intl/circulars/sk973046.htm >.
" See Indonesian Companies' 1997 Results Reflect Pain; Worse to Come,
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Apr. 30, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allbbn
File.
41 See Alistair Hammond, Million Indonesian Construction Workers to Lose
Jobs in '98, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Dec. 19, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Allbbn File.
42 See, e.g., Jakarta Office Demand Likely to Fall Up to 40% in 1998-1999,
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Oct. 15, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allbbn
File (noting that potential renters and buyers are likely to ask for better terms).
i' The imjact of the Asian financial crisis caused roughly 75% of Indone-
sia's registeredconstruction companies to cease operations. See About 75% of
Indonesia's Construction Firms Out of Business, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Apr. 19,
1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allbbn File.
44 See Indonesia's Trakindo Reaps Reward of Hedging Debt, BLOOMBERG
NEWS, Oct. 14, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library,Allbbn File.
1999]
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collateral enforcement procedures in Indonesia were so underde-
veloped that banks could not realistically choose to foreclose on
pledged property.45 Moreover, even had foreclosure been possi-
ble, the steep fall in real estate prices meant that by the time of
the default the property used to secure a loan often was worth
only a fraction of the outstanding loan principal amount.
In addition to defaults by property companies, high concen-
trations of loans to the property sector left Indonesian banks vul-
nerable to the Asian financial crisis for another reason: the de-
pendence of many banks on short term funding from overseas.46
By their nature, loans to the property sector tend to have rela-
tively long terms and be serviced by local currency cashflows.47
Indonesian banks funded many of these loans, however, with
relatively short-term funding from foreign sources denominated
in U.S. dollars, Japanese yen and other foreign currencies.48
Short-term borrowing from abroad was a relatively inexpen-
sive source of funds,49 provided that the banks did not incur addi-
tional costs purchasing hedging instruments to protect themselves
from any depreciation of the rupiah against the currency they had
borrowed. Unhedged foreign currency borrowing posed an ob-
vious risk to a bank; any depreciation of the rupiah during the
term of the loan would mean that the amount of rupiah needed to
repay the loan on maturity would be greater than the amount re-
4' This conclusion is based on discussions I have had with various Indone-
sian lawyers. Interview and discussion with Indonesian lawyers and bankers,
in Jakarta, Indonesia (1996 & 1997) [hereinafter Interview]. In general, foreclo-
sure on pledged property under Indonesian law requires use of a cumbersome
court-adininistered auction procedure.
46 See Shirazi, supra note 16; Asia Crisis Homepage, supra note 16.
4 Although loans to the real estate sector in Indonesia are, for the most
part, serviced by rupiah cashflows, certain retail and commercial developments
in Jakarta and other large cities generate U.S. dollar paments. Certain first
class malls, for example, charge tenants rent in U.S. dollars. See, e.g., Indone-
sian Malls Owners Urged to Stop Charging Rents in Dollars, BLOOMBERG NEWS,
Dec. 28, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allbbn File ('The Indone-
sian Franchise Association (AFI) is urging mall operators to charge rents inru-
piah, not dollars....").
48 The total outstanding external short term debt in Indonesia increased
from US$19.5 billion in 1994 to US$32.3 billion in 1996. See Shirazi, supra
note 16.
4 See Shirazi, supra note 16 (discussing the flow of investment capital to
the so-called "emerging market economies," such as Indonesia, in the years
immediately prior to the Asian financial crisis and the historically tight credit




ceived by the borrower upon drawing the loan. Nevertheless, the
Indonesian government's foreign exchange rate policy uninten-
tionally provided an economic rationale for leaving foreign cur-
rency exposure unhedged prior to the Asian financial crisis."
Until August 14, 1997, the Indonesian government main-
tained an intervention band system under which the government
pledged to intervene in the markets, through such means as for-
eign exchange purchases and interest rate adjustments, if the ru-
piah depreciated or appreciated against the U.S. dollar beyond a
set percentage. 51 Assuming that the government would maintain
the intervention band, an Indonesian bank borrowing in U.S. dol-
lars simply could compare the cost of purchasing a hedging in-
strument with the maximum depreciation of the rupiah against
the U.S. dollar permitted under the intervention band during the
term of the loan. Hedging the currency exposure only would be
economically justified, therefore, when the cost of the hedging in-
strument was less than the maximum potential depreciation of
the rupiah under the intervention band system.
Because short-term funding on an unhedged basis is so attrac-
tive, much of the Indonesian banking sector's foreign borrowing
has remained unhedged.5 2 Indonesian banks, therefore, were
faced with an unhedged funding mismatch between borrowing
short-term from abroad in foreign currency and lending long-
term in rupiah. 3 This funding mismatch, combined with the
general refusal of foreign banks to extend new loans after the
Asian financial crisis began, put the Indonesian banking sector in
a very precarious position.
When the Indonesian government abolished the intervention
band system on August 14, 1997 in the face of large-scale selling of
" See Ali Wardhana, Overcoming the Current Economic Downturn (last
modified Aug. 25, 1998) <http://www.indoexchange.com>; see also Shirazi,
supra note 16.
"' See Monetary Policy (visited Jan. 20, 1999) <http://www.bi.go.id/intl
/policies/index.html> [hereinafter Indonesia Monetary Policy]; see also Claire
Leow et al., Indonesia Floats the Rupiah; Currency Sinks 5%, BLOOMBERG
NEws, Aug. 14, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allbbn File. For a
discussion of the abandonment of the intervention band system, see also Ter-
mination of the Rupiah Intervention Band (visited Jan. 20, 1999)
< http://www.bi.go.id/intl/press/304pr1997.htm >.
52 See Shirazi, supra note 16.
See generally Jeffrey D. Sachs, The Wrong Medicine for Asia, N.Y. TIMEs,
Nov. 3, 1997, at A23 (describing the ]MF Asian bailout proposal); Corsetti et
al., supra note 16.
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rupiah in the foreign currency markets, the rupiah depreciated
sharply against the U.S. dollar and other currencies in which the
Indonesian banks had borrowed. 4 Because of the depreciation of
the rupiah, the amount of rupiah that Indonesian banks earned on
their long-term loans to the property sector and other industries,
even assuming those loans were all fully performing, was no
longer sufficient to service their short-term foreign borrowings."5
Moreover, the banks could no longer attract new funds from
abroad that could be used to repay the short-term borrowings
that were maturing.5 6
At the same time that banks were losing their foreign funding
sources, it was becoming increasingly difficult for them to source
funds in the domestic market. In response to the devaluation of
the rupiah, the Indonesian government raised short-term rupiah
interest rates in order to try to stabilize the fall of the currency,
thereby increasing the cost of funds for the banking sector.57 Dur-
ing one week in mid-August 1997, for example, the overnight in-
terbank lending rate was increased by over 36%."8
In the interest of protecting the rupiah, Bank Indonesia also
temporarily suspended several of the means which Indonesian
banks use to obtain short-term liquidity, including its purchase of
SBPUs and its repurchase facility for SBIs. 9 Bank Indonesia uses
" See supra text accompanying note 17.
55 See id.
56 See, e.g., Shirazi, supra note 16; Goldstein, supra note 16.
17 See Indonesia Monetary Policy, supra note 51; see also Andi Asrun,
Soedradad Says Rates Protect Rupiah, Ensure Smart Borrowing, BLOOMBERG
NEWS, Aug. 19, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allbbn File; Bank In-
donesia Appeals Strict Monetary Policy (visited Jan 20, 1999)
<http://www.bi.go.id/intl/press/50Spr1997.htm> (Bank Indonesia press re-
lease dated August 20, 1997).
" On Monday, August 11, 1997, the overnight interbank rupiah rate
('JIBOR") was 15.875%. By Monday of the following week (August 18, 1997)
the overnight JIBOR was 51.429%, and by Friday of that week (Augst 22,
1997) the overnight JIBOR was 87.778%. See, e.g., Dan Murphy, Indonesian
Overnight Interbank Lending Rate Surges to 51.42%, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Aug.
18, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allbbn File [hereinafter Lending
Rate Surges].
'9 See Indonesia Monetary Policy, supra note 51. SBPU is an acronym for
"Surat Berharga Pasar Uang" and SBI is an acronym for "Sertifikat Bank Indo-
nesia." SBPUs are generally issued with one or two weekdurations. SBIs gen-
erally are issued every Wednesday with a one month duration, but beginning
in October 1998, Bank Indonesia also began issuing three month SBIs once
each month. See, e.g., Bank Indonesia, Auction Result: Certificate of Bank Indo-
nesia (SBI) (visited Jan. 21, 1999) <http://www.bi.go.id./intl/press/lelan
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SBPUs and SBIs, money market instruments, to control liquidity
in the domestic banking system. In general, Bank Indonesia pur-
chases SBPUs on a discount basis6' from banks to inject liquidity
into the system and sells SBIs to banks to absorb liquidity from
the system. SBIs, however, also can be a source of liquidity for
banks, because Bank Indonesia ordinarily maintains an SBI repur-
chase facility under which banks can sell SBIs to the central bank
with an obligation to repurchase them at a later date.6' By sus-
pending both the purchase of SBPUs and the repurchase facility
for SBIs, Bank Indonesia severely tightened domestic liquidity.
A sharp public loss of confidence in most of the country's
banks further aggravated the liquidity crisis faced by the Indone-
sian banks by leading to large-scale depositor withdrawals.62 Fear-
ing bank failures in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, deposi-
tors withdrew their funds from those banks that were perceived
to be weak and moved them either to stronger domestic banks or
gsbi141098.html> (Bank Indonesia press release dated October 14, 1998). See
also Indonesia to Start Selling 3-Month Treasury Bills Wednesday, BLOOMBERG
NEWs, Oct. 12, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allbbn File.
Purchasing SBPUs on a "discount basis" means, in a hypothetical exam-
ple, that Bank Indonesia purchases 100 rupiah principal amount of one-week
SBPUs from a bank for 99 rupiah, and when those SBPUs mature one week
later, the bank repays Bank Indonesia the full 100 rupiah principal amount.
The difference between the principal amount and the purchase price represents
the interest rate applicable to the SBPUs, which in this hypothetical example
would be 52% per annum (i.e., 1% paid over one week equals 52% paid over
one year).
61 Repurchase agreements (often known as "repos") are a relatively com-
mon method for obtaining funding in the capital markets. A repurchase
agreement is similar to a secured loan in that the seller in arepo (like the bor-
rower in a secured loan transaction) assigns a security to another party in ex-
change for cash, and, on the maturity date of the transaction, the seller repays
the cash amount plus interest to the other party and receives the security in re-
turn.
62 See generally Waking Up, supra note 19, at 46 ('As IMF agreements were
broken, locals and foreigners panicked, and investors and bankers fled in
droves, demanding instant repayment of debt, cutting off letters of credit, sell-
ing down stock prices and pushing interest rates to astronomical levels."); Dr.
Miranda S. Goeltom's Virtual Interview, (visited Jan. 21, 1999)
<http://www.bi.go.id/intl/goenom/index.html> [hereinafter Goeltom In-
terview] (describing how operations in the banking system can go awry when
the public trust deteriorates); Indonesia Monetary Policy, supra note 51 ("The
situation was further aggravated by the crisis of confidence in the banking sec-
tor, which led to massive withdrawals of deposits .... ").
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overseas.63 This shifting of deposits primarily involved money be-
ing moved from the smaller private banks to state-owned and for-
eign banks, as well as to the few larger private banks that were
considered to be in relatively good financial health." During the
period between October 1997 and January 1998, for example,
Bank Indonesia figures show that, in the aggregate, approximately
24.3 trillion rupiah was withdrawn from the private banks."5 Al-
though much of these funds were re-deposited into state-owned
and foreign banks in the country, 11.4 trillion rupiah was with-
drawn from the Indonesian banking system entirely.66
Finally, a percentage of loans that were nonperforming rap-
idly increased throughout the banking sector, putting further
pressure on banking liquidity. The list of defaulted borrowers
was not limited to the property sector. The devaluation of the
rupiah, combined with the sharp increase in domestic interest
rates, caused a rash of loan defaults by Indonesian manufacturers,
other corporate borrowers, and property companies. 7
In the aggregate, Indonesian corporations borrowed substan-
tially more from overseas than did the country's banks. As of the
end of February 1998, for example, the total external debt in-
curred by Indonesian nonbank corporations stood at approxi-
mately US$57 billion, as compared with the roughly US$8 billion
that had been borrowed from abroad by the country's banks.68
Like banks, Indonesian companies left much of their foreign cur-
rency borrowing unhedged.69 Thus, as the value of the rupiah
plummeted against the U.S. dollar and other foreign currencies in
which companies had borrowed, the total debt burden, in rupiah
63 See Waking Up, supra note 19, at 47; see also Goeltom's Interview, supra
note 62.
64 See Alistair Hammond & Andi Asrun, Bank Closures Trigger Concern
about Other Indonesia's Banks, Nov. 4, 1997, available in Bloomberg News
Service.
65 See Goeltom Interview, supra note 62.
66 See id.
67 See Hammond, supra note 37; see also Bambang Subianto, Speech, Strate-
gies for Recovery: National Financial Directives in a Regional Setting (Aug. 25,
1998) in <http://www.indoexchange.com/bagong/pubic/cms-speeches/
bambong.htm>.
68 See Indonesia: External Debt (visited Jan. 21, 1999) <http://
www.bi.go.id/intl/press/bi3lprl6.htm> (Bank Indonesia press release dated
May 13, 1998).
69 See Indonesia Monetary Policy, supra note 51.
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terms, of the Indonesian corporate sector increased dramatically.'
At the same time, high interest rates were suppressing demand in
the country for goods and services of all kinds, thereby depressing
corporate earnings."' Such conditions resulted in many Indone-
sian companies being unable to service their debts to both foreign
and domestic creditors.7
As a result of this combination of factors, Indonesian banks
faced a severe shortage of funds that left much of the banking sec-
tor technically insolvent by September 1997.' Faced with the
prospect of widespread bank failures, the Indonesian government
reversed the tight monetary policies that it had been pursuing to
protect the rupiah and began providing moderate liquidity sup-
port to the country's banks.7 4 The government signaled its policy
reversal in an economic policy package introduced by the Indone-
sian cabinet on September 3, 1997 that included a number of
measures aimed at injecting liquidity back into the banking sec-
tor.
75
One of the measures taken by the government was to lower
short-term interest rates. The one-week JIBOR rate fell, for ex-
ample, from a weekly high of 72.5% during the last week of
August 1997 to a weekly high of 43.8% during the first week of
September 1997 when the policy package was introduced.76 This
lowering of interest rates reduced the costs incurred by banks
borrowing in the interbank market. Bank Indonesia also injected
funds directly into a number of banks.77  They provided the li-
quidity support in the form of subordinated loans to banks as
well as deposits of government funds. Bank Indonesia, for exam-
ple, liquidated a large portfolio of SBIs in which it had invested
state enterprise funds and deposited that money into certain gov-
ernment-owned banks.
70 See Alistair Hammond & Andi Asrun, supra note 64.
7 See id.
72 See Subianto, supra note 67.
'" See generally Goeltom Interview, supra note 62 (describing the effect of a
rush of bank withdrawals, resulting illiquidity and insolvency).
7' See Indonesia Monetary Policy, supra note 51.
5 See id.
7 See Bloomberg News Service, Close/Ask/Yield (search for JIBOR-
RUPIAH yield).
77 Indonesia Monetary Policy, supra note 51.
78 See id.
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Most importantly, however, Bank Indonesia re-opened both
the SBPU facility and the SBI repurchase facility for banks that
met certain criteria.79 The primary criteria for using these dis-
count facilities was that the banks resume lending to small scale
enterprises, a sector of the economy that had been particularly
devastated by the tight credit conditions following the Asian fi-
nancial crisis."0 The re-opening of the SBPU and SBI facilities
provided a ready source of short-term funding for the roughly
seventy banks that met Bank Indonesia's requirements.
Moreover, the interest rates that banks paid for SBPU financ-
ing were kept artificially low as an additional type of government
subsidy to the banking sector." Bank Indonesia maintained low
SBPU rates by purchasing SBPUs directly from selected banks at
set rates rather than utilizing the more market driven auction
procedure.8 2 For the period between September 15, 1997 and Oc-
tober 20, 1997, for example, while the one week JIBOR rate fluc-
tuated between a high of 35.56% and a low of 21.38%, the one
week SBPU rate was held steady by Bank Indonesia at 14.75%.13
The types of measures taken by the Indonesian government to
inject liquidity into the country's banks were neither new nor
unusual. Actions such as adjusting interest rates, allocating state
enterprise funds and balancing SBI sales against SBPU purchases
are the usual instruments employed by Bank Indonesia to regulate
the level of liquidity in the banking sector.
What was unusual in the wake of the Asian financial crisis was
the degree to which these measures were relied on by the banking
industry. The demands put on Bank Indonesia for liquidity sup-
port were enormous and unprecedented. In January 1998, for ex-
ample, it is estimated that Bank Indonesia faced demands from
71 See id.; see also Dan Murphy, Indonesia Lets 70 Banks Borrow Money at
SBPU Discount Window, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Oct. 22, 1997, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Allbbn File.
8o See Indonesia Monetary Policy, supra note 51.
s' See Banks on Life Support, supra note 19. On the discounting of SBPUs,
see supra text accompanying note 60.
82 See Banks on Life Support, supra note 19. In a government bill auction,
participants are invited to submit bids for bills, and the price at which the bills
are then sold, as well as the allocations of bills among participants, is based on
the bids received.
83 See Bloomberg News Service, One Week JIBOR Rates; Bloomberg




banks for up to the rupiah equivalent of US$500 million a day. 4
Because the Asian financial crisis essentially bankrupted most of
the banking sector, the banks were wholly dependent on gov-
ernment support."5 Rather than being used solely as a tool of
monetary policy, liquidity support became the only means of sol-
vency for the majority of the Indonesian banking system. 6
3. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A HIGHLY VULNERABLE BANKING
SYSTEM
The Indonesian government began to deregulate the domestic
banking industry in 1983,8' but the most significant reforms were
contained in a package promulgated by Bank Indonesia in 1988
and in a new banking law enacted in 1992.88 Since this reform
process was the subject of my 1995 article, I will not review the
reforms again in detail in this Article. In general, the banking de-
regulation program in Indonesia involved opening up a previ-
ously state-bank-dominated sector to increased private competi-
tion and reducing direct government control over basic banking
practices, such as the setting of interest rates and the allocation of
loans.89
In my 1995 article, I concluded that the Indonesian banking
sector following deregulation had five dominant characteristics:
(1) rapid credit growth; (2) the proliferation of a large number of
poorly capitalized private banks; (3) increased competition among
banks for customers; (4) significant over-exposure of banks to sin-
gle customers and affiliated companies; and (5) a lack of adequate
prudential standards and safeguards.' These characteristics sug-
See Waking Up, supra note 19, at 47.
s See Banks on Life Support, supra note 19.
86 See id.
87 The 1983 reforms were enacted at a time when Indonesia's earnings
from its principal export commodity, oil, were declining. In the two-year pe-
riod, 1982 to 1983, for example, Indonesia's export earnings from oil fell by
24%. The Indonesian government recognized that a more efficient and well-
developed banking system would help foster the creation of a more diversified
nationml economy. The principal change affected by the 1983 reforms was the
abolishment of Bank Indonesia control over interest rates on deposits and
loans. See William Keeling,Jakarta Struggles to Control Its Deregulation: Indone-
sia 's Test of Economic Management May Have Just Begun, FIN. TIMEs, June 9,
1992, at 4.
88 See supra text accompanying note 2.
89 See Bennett, supra note 1, at 443.
91 See id. at 470.
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gest a banking system that was very susceptible to a downturn in
the economy.
Because the fundamental business of banking exposes banks to
both credit and market risks,91 the health of the banking industry
in any country is dependent to a large extent on the general state
of that country's economy. If general economic conditions dete-
riorate, in almost all cases, banking revenues and profits also will
decline. However, some banks and banking systems, such as In-
donesia's on the eve of the Asian financial crisis, are particularly
vulnerable to economic downturns.
A bank that is poorly capitalized and has a highly concen-
trated loan portfolio, for example, stands a high risk of failing if
any one or more of its largest borrowers defaults on its loans.
When a banking system includes many such banks and, moreo-
ver, the system is characterized by rapid credit growth and tight
competition that cause banks to lend increasingly larger amounts
of money at increasingly smaller profit spreads,92 the banking sys-
tem itself stands a high risk of failing. Any sharp decline in the
economy that causes significant numbers of borrowers to become
unable to service their loans could trigger a system-wide collapse.
Maintaining the long-term viability of such a banking system
would require close supervision by regulators to ensure that
banks were undertaking reasonably prudent risk management
practices.93 Through close supervision, regulators could, for ex-
ample, require a bank to reduce its credit exposure to a borrower
that was experiencing financial difficulties before those difficulties
rose to a level that could threaten the bank's solvency. Such close
regulatory supervision was completely lacking, however, in the
Indonesian banking system following deregulation.94
91 As used in this context, the term "credit risk" refers to the risk that a
borrower will default on a loan while the term "market risk" refers to the risk
that, due to changes in interest rates, foreign exchange rates, credit spreads or
other market conditions, the value of a bank's assets will decline.
92 See Jathon Sapsford & Darren McDermott, The Global Credit Crunch:
Asian Retrenchment Is Penetrating Everywhere, Hindering Recovery, ASIAN
WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 1998, at 1 (commenting that competition to lend to busi-
nesses in Indonesia and Thailand became so strong just prior to the Asian fi-
nancial crisis that loan margins were often as low as one-tenth of the loan mar-
gins that were prevailing in 1993).





The regulatory framework of the banking system was under-
developed and the regulators themselves were understaffed and
poorly trained to provide adequate external supervision.9s Be-
cause of the lack of both effective regulation and effective en-
forcement of what regulation did exist, Indonesian banks were
given a high degree of autonomy to pursue risky lending prac-
tices. 96 Such lending practices are largely responsible for the fate
of the Indonesian banking system in the wake of the Asian finan-
cial crisis.97
In the case of the state-owned banks, risky lending practices
were often the result of political pressure exerted by high ranking
government officials on banks to make loans to certain borrow-
ers.9" The practice of making loans based on political pressure be-
came known as "memo lending," because the loans were said to
be extended based solely on a memo sent to the bank by a senior
official or other influential person.99 Memo lending led to high
levels of non-performing loans at the state-owned banks for two
related reasons.
First, as the prevalence of memo lending evidences, Indone-
sia's economy was characterized by high levels of cronyism and
political patronage."°  In such an environment, officials at the
state-owned banks often viewed their job security and career ad-
vancement as being more dependent on their ability to satisfy po-
litical patrons than on their bank's financial performance." For
a bank officer, satisfying political patrons generally involved fi-




9' See, e.g., Tony Shale, Mar'ie's Lone War Against Corruption,
EUROMONEY, Aug. 1994, at 20 [hereinafterMarie's Lone War].
" See id. at 20.
00 See id.; see also John McBeth, Banking on Friends: Business and Politics
Mix in Bapindo Case, FAR E. ECON. REV., June 23, 1994, at 25-26; Manuela
Saragosa, Favours' Blamed for Putting Indonesia in Second Division: Accusations
of Politically Motivated Protection, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1994, at 6; World Bank
Sets Up Corruption Teams for Indonesia, Paper Says, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Sept.
15, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allbbn File. On the issue of cor-
ruption and economic development generally, see Cheryl W. Gray & Daniel
Kaufmann, Corruption and Development (visited Jan. 21, 1999)
<http://www.wordbank.org/landd/english/0398/articles/020398/htm>.
101 See McBeth, supra note 100, at 25-26.
102 See Mar'ie's Lone War, supra note 98, at 20.
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Therefore, if a high-ranking official supported a loan being made
to a certain borrower, a state-owned bank often would make that
loan without employing proper due diligence techniques to assess
the risk involved. 3
Second, borrowers often regarded loans extended by the state-
owned banks with the support of a high-ranking patron as forms
of governmental assistance, rather than as commercial obligations
that needed to be repaid in full and on a timely basis." 4 Memo
lending, therefore, resulted in many state-owned banks being sad-
dled with loans made to companies of questionable creditworthi-
ness that had no firm intention to repay."0
In the case of the private banks, risky lending practices gener-
ally involved banks making loans to affiliated companies; the
1988 regulatory reforms, which substantially liberalized the re-
quirements for establishing a new bank in the country, resulted in
many of Indonesia's business conglomerates opening private
banks.0 6 These banks often were not managed on an independent
basis, but rather were operated as captive funding sources for the
conglomerate's businesses. In other words, such banks extended
loans to affiliated companies to suit the funding needs of the con-
glomerate as a whole and on terms dictated by the conglomerate's
senior officers rather than based on a prudent credit assessment of
the individual borrowers.107
Not surprisingly, conglomerates often used their private
banks to fund affiliated companies and projects that were not suf-
ficiently creditworthy to be able to borrow money from an unre-
lated third party lender.108 Loans to affiliated companies, there-
fore, were often among the riskiest loans held by the private
103 See id.; see also Goldstein, supra note 16.
104 See Mar'ie's Lone War, supra note 98, at 20.
105 See id.
106 Chapter IV of the Banking Law authorizes the Minister of Finance to
grant banking licenses, subject to certain requirements with respect to the or-
ganizational composition, capital, ownership and business plan of the appli-
cant, as well as other matters. On the Banking Law generally, see William A.
Sullivan, International Banking: Indonesia, INT'LFIN. L. REV., Sept. 1992, at 21.
107 See id.
108 See generally Jay Solomon, Bank of Sinar Mas Group Shows Few Recovery
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banks.0 9 In addition, the concentrated credit exposure that many
of the private banks had to affiliated companies meant that those
banks were exposed to the highly correlated risk that both their
largest borrowers and their owners, since they were all in same
corporate group, would experience financial difficulty at the same
time."' In other words, if affiliated borrowers began defaulting
on their loans in large numbers, it was likely that the bank's
owners would also be experiencing financial difficulty and would
be unable to inject fresh capital into the bank to maintain its sol-
vency.
The Indonesian government attempted to address the problem
of excessive lending to affiliated companies in the Banking Law
enacted in 1992.1 The Banking Law contains provisions that re-
strict the aggregate amount that a bank may lend to affiliated
companies to twenty percent of the bank's capital."1 However,
enforcement of those restrictions was generally quite lax and vio-
lations were rampant.'
Indonesian private banks used various means to fund affiliated
companies in excess of the affiliate lending limits. The structures
that banks used to conceal intra-group lending above the restric-
tions of the Banking Law varied depending on the degree of con-
cern that a particular bank's management had that such excessive
affiliate lending would be detected and sanctioned by bank regula-
tors. In many cases, private banks simply underreported the
loans that they made to affiliates."' In other cases, banks used
109 See generally Indonesia Detains Two Bankers, supra note 19; Indonesia's
Modern Group Pledges to Repay Debts, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Sept. 11, 1998,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Allbbn File [hereinafter Modern Group
Pledges].
1o See generally Indonesia Detains Two Bankers, supra note 19; Modern
Group Pledges, supra note 109.
... See generally Sullivan, supra note 106.
"2 See Banking Industry, supra note 35.
113 See Alistair Hammond, Indonesia Says It May Take Over More Weak
Banks, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Sept. 29, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Allbbn File [hereinafter Indonesia Says]. According to Bank Indonesia's fig-
ures, 51 banks violated the affiliate lending limits in 1997, an increase from 46
banks in 1996. See Welcome to Bank Indonesia (visited Jan. 21, 1999)
<http://www.bi.go.id/intl>. Because of the various structures used to dis-
guise intra-group ending, however, it is likely that Bank Indonesia's figures
understate the extent of the violations of the affiliate lending limits.
114 See Banking Industry, supra note 35.
1999]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J Int'l Econ. L.
various conduits to channel funds indirectly to affiliated compa-
nies."'
The types of conduits used for this purpose included nonbank
finance companies, unrelated companies that would receive a fee
for their role in such transactions and special purpose vehicles
setup by the bank or the borrower specifically to act as con-
duits."6 In the simplest conduit structure, a bank lends money to
the conduit entity, which in turn lends that money to the bank's
affiliate."' The loan generally is nonrecourse to the conduit en-
tity, with the conduit's only obligation being to pass on to the
bank the interest and principal payments that it receives from the
affiliate."' The transaction is recorded in the bank's records as
simply a loan to the conduit entity without any reference to the
fact that the bank's ultimate credit exposure with respect to the
loan is to an affiliate. Although use of some variation of this sim-
ple structure was not uncommon, more complex conduit struc-
tures also were developed to evade detection by bank regula-
tors.
119
115 This discussion on the use of conduits to fund affiliated companies in
excess of the limits contained in the Banking Law is based on conversations




"I A "nonrecourse" loan means that the lender does not have recourse to
the general assets of the borrower to satisfy its claims in the event of a default.
See BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 1057 (6th ed. 1990). In most conduit struc-
tures, the loan to the conduit ("Loan #1") isnonrecourse to the conduit but is
secured by the conduit's rights in the loan made from the conduit to the affili-
ate ("Loan #2"). The conduit has an obligation to pay over to the bank under
Loan #1 the payments that it receives from the affiliate under Loan #2. If the
affiliate defaults, the conduit has no further payment obligations under Loan
#1 and the bank can, pursuant to the security interest that it has in Loan #1,
pursue the affiliate directly for payment. See Interview,supra note 45.
119 It should be noted that indirect lending to affiliated companies through
conduits in excess of the affiliate lending limits is only arguably a violation of
the Banking Law. See Interview, supra note 45. In general, Indonesian legal
principles emphasize a relatively strict interpretation of code and regulatory
Frovisions. Recharacterizing a transaction to emphasize its substance over its
orm or sanctioning an indirect violation of a regulation are not common legal
concepts in Indonesia. With regard to the affiliate lending rules under the
Banking Law, I have spoken with several Indonesian lawyers who take the po-
sition that, since indirect lending to affiliates through conduit structures is not
covered expressly by the language of the Banking Law, such transactions are
not subject to the affiliate lending limits. See id. Whether or not they consti-
tuted violations of the Banking Law, however, private banks generally at-
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Certain private banks, for example, established a unit trust or
other type of mutual fund in a tax haven jurisdiction.12 The
bank would then directly or indirectly purchase all the units of
the fund and, in its capacity as sole owner of the fund's units, di-
rect the fund to make investments in debt instruments issued by
affiliated companies of the bank. Although only an investment in
an offshore mutual fund would appear on the bank's balance
sheet, the end effect of the fund making investments in debt in-
struments of affiliated companies was the same as if the bank had
loaned money to such affiliates.121
Private banks also provided various types of credit support for
loans made to affiliated companies by unrelated third party lend-
ers." Based on such credit support, affiliated companies were
able to obtain financing from outside sources that would not have
been available based solely on the affiliate's own credit worthi-
ness.12 Although the provision of credit support by a bank for
the benefit of an affiliated company did not violate the express
terms of the affiliate lending limits, such transactions subverted
the policy behind the lending limits by permitting banks to incur
credit exposure to affiliates in excess of twenty percent of their
share capital.2
The types of credit support provided by private banks for
their affiliates included direct loan guarantees, as well as more so-
phisticated financial instruments such as total return swaps and
credit default swaps under which the risk on the loan was passed
from the unrelated third party lender to the affiliated bank.12
tempted to structure conduit transactions to avoid disclosure to, and detection
by, regulators. See hi.
120 See id.
121 See id.
122 See generally Bank ofSinarMas Group, supra note 108, at 13.
123 See id.
124 See id.
125 To illustrate the use of total return swaps and credit default swaps for
credit support purposes, assume that a bank ("Unrelated Bank") makes a loan
(the "Loan") to a company (the"Borrower") affiliated with another bank ("Af-
filiated Bank"). In a total return swap, Unrelated Bank and Affiliated Bank en-
ter into a swap agreement under which (a) Unrelated Bank pays to Affiliated
Bank the interest and principal payments received on the Loan from the Bor-
rower; and (b) Affiliated Bank pays to Unrelated Bank fixed or floating rate
interest payments and the principal amount of the Loan on maturity. Such a
swap agreement is referred to as a "total return swap" because Unrelated Bank
is paying its "total return" on the Loan over to Affiliated Bank in exchange for
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One attraction to banks of instruments such as swaps as opposed
to direct guarantees was that, whereas guarantees are recorded in a
designated place in a bank's financial statements, the accounting
treatment for swaps is less well-defined.'26 In many cases, banks
would simply setout the total aggregate notional amount of all of
their swap positions in a footnote to their financial statements
and not disclose any specific terms of such swaps.
The risky lending practices engaged in by Indonesian banks
were not limited, however, to politically motivated loans by the
state-owned banks and excessive intra-group lending by private
banks. Indonesian banks also accumulated high risk loans simply
by extending credit to companies and individuals without first
obtaining sufficient information to assess the borrower's ability
to repay."
In general, Indonesian companies did not adhere to interna-
tional accounting standards or otherwise provide meaningful lev-
els of financial disclosure with regard to their operations.128 Be-
cause of this low level of corporate disclosure, Indonesian banks
could rarely apply the risk-assessment techniques used by banks
in more developed economies to decide whether to make a
certain payrments from Affiliated Bank. The effect of such a total return swap
transaction is to pass the risk on the Loan to Affiliated Bank, because any de-
fault on the Loan by Borrower will reduce the "total return" payments due
from Unrelated Bank to Affiliated Bank under the swap agreement. In a credit
default swap, Unrelated Bank and Affiliated Bank enter into a swap agreement
under which (a) Unrelated Bank pays to Affiliated Bank a certain set amount;
and (b) Affiliated Bank agrees that, if the Borrower defaults on the Loan, Af-
filiated Bank will pay Unrelated Bank an amount necessary to compensate Un-
related Bank for the loss incurred by Unrelated Bank with respect to the Loan.
A credit default swap in this context is, therefore, equivalent to a guarantee of
the Loan by Affiliated Bank (with the amount received by Affiliated Bank
from Unrelated Bank under the swap agreement equivalent to a loan guarantee
fee).
126 See, e.g., S. Karene Witcher, Hidden Loans, Derivatives Raise Cost of In-
donesian Bank Bailout ASIAN WALL ST. J., June 25, 1998, at 1. On the general
issue of the disclosure by banks of their derivatives positions see Basle Com-
mittee on Banking Supervision, Survey ofDisclosures about Trading and Deriva-
tives Activities of Banks and Securities Firms 1997, (visited Jan. 21, 1999)
< http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs44.htm > [hereinafter BIS Homepage].
127 See Wardhana, supra note 50.
12 See id. For a discussion of Asia's generally poor accounting standards,
see James T. Areddy, Accountants Are in the Spotlight of Asian Crisis, ASIAN
WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 1998, at 4.
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loan.129 Unable to exercise financial due diligence when making
lending decisions, banks often were left to rely on the reputation
of a company, its physically apparent traits such as the number
and quality of its properties, or, in some cases, even less reliable
indicators of a prospective borrower's financial health, such as the
size of the company president's home or the make of his or her
car.
130
The extremely low capitalization of the great majority of the
country's banks magnified the systemic risk to the banking sys-
tem posed by these types of lending practices. The Banking Law
enacted in 1992 set the minimum paid-in capital requirement for
newly established banks at only the then rupiah equivalent of
roughly US$5 million.31 This minimum capital requirement was
very low by international standards. By comparison, when Tai-
wan deregulated its banking system in 1989 to permit the estab-
lishment of private banks, Taiwan's government set the mini-
mum paid-in capital requirement at approximately US$370
million.
132
Although most of Indonesia's banks had a higher capitaliza-
tion than the statutory minimum set by the Banking Law, only a
few of the country's largest banks were capitalized at or above
US$500 million prior to the Asian financial crisis."3 The major-
129 See Todd Eastham & Alistair Hammond, Indonesia's Subianto Faults
Bankers for Indiscriminate Lending, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Oct. 4, 1998, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Allbbn File.
' See Wardhana, supra note 50; see also Eastman & Hammond, supra note
129 ("Yet in many countries, including Indonesia, the lack of inf6rmation
meant investors made decisions 'more on the basis of market sentiment and
less on objective information' ..... ) (citation omitted).
131 The minimum paid-in capital requirement was set at IDR 10 billion. In
September 1995, however, Bank Indonesia raised the minimum capital re-
quirement for state-owned banks to IDR 1 trillion and announced that all
banks with foreign exchange licenses would be required to increase their paid-
in capital to at least IDR 150 billion by September 22, 2001. See Standard &
Poor's Creditwire on Indonesia, supra note 33.
132 See Lawrence S. Liu, Financial Developments and Foreign Investment
Strategies in Taiwan- A Legal and Policy Perspective, 25 INT'L LAW. 69, 83
(1991).
133 Based on 1996 and 1997 figures, only nine Indonesian banks had share
capital of US$500 million or more. See Brian Caplen, All Set for Recovery,
EUROMONEY, Aug. 1998, at 79 [hereinafter Set for Recovery]. These included
Bank Danamon Indonesia, Bank Rakyat Indonesia, Bank Central Asia, Bank
Negara Indonesia, Bank Dagang Negara, Bank Bumi Daya, Bank Ekspor Im-
por Indonesia, Bank Internasional Indonesia, and Bank Tabungan Negara. See
id.
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ity of the country's more than 200 banks, in contrast, had well
under US$100 million of paid-in capital, meaning that the Indo-
nesian banking sector had an extremely small capital base by de-
veloped economy standards,"' and a marginal to weak capital base
by emerging market economy standards.13
On the eve of the Asian financial crisis, therefore, the Indone-
sian banking sector appeared relatively vibrant in terms of credit
growth and competition, but it had an inherently weak core. The
banking industry consisted of a large number of poorly capital-
ized banks that engaged in risky lending practices which caused a
high percentage of their loans to become non-performing.13'
These weaknesses, however, did not appear suddenly in 1997.
They had developed and deepened over many years as the direct
result of the Indonesian government deregulating the banking
system without simultaneously installing adequate mechanisms
for the prudential supervision of banks.
137
The lack of effective regulatory scrutiny of banking transac-
tions gave banks substantial discretion to assess and manage risks
as they saw fit.13 Bankers also had little reason to believe that
regulators would detect or punish violations of banking regula-.
tions 39 This discretion and lack of accountability led to the pro-
liferation of the types of risky banking practices described
above.1"
134 In a list of the world's 200 largest banks by share capital published in
June 1998, the list identified the five largest banks (with their country of estab-
lishment and capitalization) as: (1) Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation
Holdings (United Kingdom), US$30.8 billion; (2) Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi
(apan), US$24.7 billion; (3) ING Group (The Netherlands), US$23.8 billion;
(4) Cr6dit Agricole (France), US$22.7 billion; and (5) The Chase Manhattan
Bank (United States) US$21.7 billion. See Bank Atlas, EUROMONEY, June
1998, at 157. Even the 200th largest bank on the list, Natexis of France, had
share capital of US$1.7 billion. See id. at 162.
135 In a list of the largest emerging market banks compiled in 1998 by the
international credit rating agency Fitch IBCA, none of the top 50 banks had
share capital of less than US$1 billion. See Set for Recovery, supranote 132.
136 By October 1998, authorities estimated that more than 50% of the loans
in the Indonesian banking system were non-performing. See Agency Cuts Rat-
ings of Banks in Indonesia, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 1998, at 22.







The tendency of banks operating in poorly regulated envi-
ronments to engage in unsound lending practices and to take on
unsustainably high levels of risk is often discussed in terms of
moral hazard."141 In this context, the expression "moral hazard"
refers to the theory that excessive risk-taking by banks is encour-
aged by the perception, whether or not grounded in actual gov-
ernment policy, that a government will not permit banks to fail
because of their importance to a country's economy."
Moral hazard may have played a part in the risky lending
practices pursued by many Indonesian banks. For example,
precedents of the Indonesian government supporting banks in fi-
nancial difficulties may have led Indonesian bankers to believe
that the government would never permit a bank failure."4 In
1991, for instance, the government injected new capital into Bank
Danamon when the bank faced large-scale depositor withdrawals
caused by rumors that it either was, or was soon to be, insol-
vent.144
However, the moral hazard theory is at most only a partial
explanation for the generally poor quality of the nation's banks'
loan portfolios. Risky loans also accumulated because lending de-
cisions were often made for reasons other than the best interests
of the bank. As described above, in the case of the state-owned
banks, banks frequently extended loans to satisfy political patrons
and, in the case of the private banks, banks often made loans to
finance affiliated companies that were not sufficiently credit wor-
141 See Ha-Joon Chang, The Hazard of Moral Hazard, FIN. TIMEs, Oct. 7,
1998, at 19 (describing "moral hazard" as the result of government guarantees
over firms and banks, which leads to risky and inefficient investments).
142 See Goldstein, supra note 16 (describing the "moral hazard" argument as
the provision of insurance by the official sector that acts as a subsidy to risk
taking and results in too many resources being channeled into insured activi-
ties); Wardhana, supra note 50. But see Chang, supra note 141, at 19 (stating
that the moral hazard explanation is relied on too frequently by analysts and
does not adequately explain the banking crises that occurred in connection
with the Asian financial crisis). The expression "moral hazard" is also used in
analyses of the Asian financial crisis to refer to the theory that foreign banks
lending to Indonesia did not adequately assess the risks of such investments be-
cause they believed that their governments, or multi-national organizations
such as the International Monetary Fund, would ensure that they did not suf-
fer any significant losses. See, e.g., Krugman, supra note 16 (describing how
"moral hazard" has led to overinvestment in Asia).
143 See Wardhana, supra note 50.
144 See id.
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thy to borrow from unrelated third parties. 4 Such conflicts of
interest occurred because of the lack of effective banking supervi-
sion."'
Furthermore, by failing to closely supervise the banking sec-
tor, Indonesian regulators did not gain a complete and accurate
assessment of the dangerously weak financial condition of the
country's banks. Regulators did not have any type of early warn-
ing system to alert them of potential solvency problems within
the banking system in sufficient time to take remedial action. As
a result, the regulators did not begin to take concerted steps to
address the weaknesses in the banking system until the system
was on the verge of collapse in connection with the Asian finan-
cial crisis.
4. THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO THE
BANKING CRISIS
As described in Section 2 of this Article, the Indonesian gov-
ernment's initial response to the severe liquidity problems faced
by Indonesian banks in the wake of the Asian financial crisis was
to rely on its usual monetary policy tools. Beginning in Septem-
ber 1997, the government began injecting substantial liquidity
into the banking system by lowering interest rates, depositing
state-owned enterprise funds into selected banks and re-opening
its government bill discount facilities."4
Such measures proved to be insufficient to stabilize the bank-
ing sector. Although Bank Indonesia's policies succeeded in pre-
venting a system-wide collapse, the continued solvency of many
Indonesian banks became wholly dependent on receiving increas-
ingly larger amounts of liquidity support. 4 As the negative bal-
ances that such banks maintained with Bank Indonesia grew
steadily larger, the government was threatened with the likeli-
hood that maintaining banking liquidity through monetary pol-
icy tools alone would put an unsustainable burden on its re-
sources. 49 Faced with that likelihood and under pressure from
145 See Alistair Hammond & Dan Murphy, Indonesia's Banks Get Pushed to
the Brink. Industry Spotlight, BLOOMBERG NEws, Nov. 17, 1997, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Allbbn File [hereinafter Pushed to the Brink].
146 See id.
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the International Monetary Fund to demonstrate that it was seri-
ous about banking reform,150 the Indonesian government changed
course in November 1997 from addressing the problems in the
banking sector solely with monetary policy adjustments to pursu-
ing a fundamental restructuring of the banking system itself.
15 1
On November 1, 1997, the Indonesian government took its
first significant step toward restructuring the banking sector
when it announced the liquidation of sixteen of the weakest pri-
vate banks. 2 The government decided to liquidate the banks in
response to a rash of depositor withdrawals occurring at a num-
ber of private banks, which threatened to become a full-scale run
on the banking system as a whole. 3 The closure of the banks
was part of a government effort to prevent such a run by restor-
ing public confidence in the banking system. The government in-
tended the action to be interpreted by the public as an affirmative
endorsement that banks not selected for liquidation were
sound.'54
Together with the liquidation of the sixteen banks, the Indo-
nesian government also attempted to bolster public confidence in
the banking sector by announcing a limited deposit protection
scheme for depositors in the closed banks. 155 Under the program,
the government guaranteed that all deposits of 20 million rupiah
or less would be repaid in full. 6 All deposits above that thresh-
old amount, as well as the claims of other creditors of the closed
150 The International Monetary Fund attached progress on bank reform as
a condition to the disbursement of financial assistance to Indonesia. See Dan
Murphy & Andi Asrun, Indonesia Shuts 16 Banks after $23 Bin IMF Package,
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Nov. 1, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allbbn
File (indicating that Indonesia would receive assistance in exchange for its
pledge to restructure its banking industry and to conduct economic reform).
151 See Indonesia Monetary Policy, supra note 51.
152 See id.; see also List of 16 Banks, supra note 25.
... See Waking Up, supra note 19; Goeltom Interview, supra note 62; see also
Murphy & Asrun, supra note 150.
154 See Murphy & Asrun, supra note 150.
155 See id.
156 See id. Based on the USD-IDR foreign exchange rate on November 1,
1997, this threshold amount was the equivalent of approximately US$5,700.
See id. In the aggregate, the government guaranteed approximately 2.3 trillion
rupiah (US$657 million) under the deposit protection scheme. See id.
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banks, were to be repaid, to the extent funds were available, from
the sale of the banks' assets."' 7
The International Monetary Fund saw the forced liquidation
of the sixteen banks as a sufficiently important first step toward
restructuring the banking system and thus rewarded the Indone-
sian government with the release of the first installment of the
promised aid package." 8 Many analysts also saw the closure of
the banks as a positive development for Indonesian banking re-
form, because the list of owners of the banks selected for closure
included people with strong political connections, including sev-
eral members of the family of then-President Suharto' 59 For ex-
ample, one of Suharto's sons, Bambang Trihatmodjo, partly
owned one of the closed banks, Bank Andromeda, and Suharto's
half-brother Probosutejo, partly owned another, Bank Jakarta. 6 °
The closure of these banks suggested that Bank Indonesia was
willing to confront some of the most powerfully vested interests
in the country.'61
Other analysts, however, pointed out that the banks selected
for liquidation were among the smallest and weakest in the coun-
157 See Murphy & Asrun, supra note 150 ("The money to pay larger de-
positors and inter-bank creditors will be raised from the sale of the banks' as-
sets.").
158 See International Monetary Fund, IMF Approves Stand-By Credit for In-
donesia, (last modified Nov. 5, 1997) <http://im-fntlx.imf.org:80/external/np
/sec/pr/1997/PR9750.htm >.
159 For a discussion of the significant business interests held by members of
the Suharto family, see Philip Shenon, For Asian Nation's First Family, Finan-
cial Empire Is in Peril, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1998, at Al. Suharto resigned as
President of Indonesia on May 21, 1998. See Keith B. Richburg, Suharto Steps
Down, Names Successor, WASH. POST, May 21, 1998, at Al.
160 See Real Crisis, supra note 36. Bambang Trihatmodjo waged an ulti-
mately unsuccessful fight against the closure of Bank Andromeda, which in-
cluded filing a lawsuit against the Minister of Finance and the Governor of
Bank Indonesia. See Dan Murphy et al., Suharto Son Sues Re ormers; Indonesia
Reform in Doubt, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Nov. 5, 1997, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Allbbn File [hereinafter Suharto Son Sues]. Although Trihatmodjo
admitted that Bank Andromeda loaned an amount in excess of 20% of its share
capital to an affiliated company, he claimed that the government unfairly sin-
gled out Bank Andromeda or quidation since, as he claimed, more than 90%
of the country banks also violated the affiliate lending limits. See id.; Pushed to
the Brink, supra note 145.
161 See Suharto Son Sues, supra note 160 (describing the need not to give in
to protesters' demands in stating [b]acktracking of any kind on the closure of
Bank Andromeda or other ban s would highlight that political interests still
block much-needed efforts to reform the economy .... ').
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try and that their closure would not have a significant impact on
the health of the banking system as a whole.162 In the aggregate,
the assets of the closed banks accounted for "less than 3.5% of In-
donesia's total banking assets." 
163
Although the government intended the closure of the sixteen
banks as a confidence building measure, the action had the oppo-
site effect on public opinion in Indonesia. Rather than restoring
confidence in the banking system, the closures intensified the
movement of funds out of the smaller private banks as depositors
worried that their own banks would be in the next wave of insti-
tutions to be liquidated."M The Governor of Bank Indonesia re-
acted to the continued withdrawals from the private banks by de-
claring, within a few days of the original liquidation
announcement, that no further banks would be closed.6 s Such
promises were not sufficient, however, to stem the flow of money
out of the smaller banks. 66
The Indonesian government took its next major policy ac-
tions with respect to banking reform in January 1998. On Janu-
ary 27, the government announced that it would guarantee the
rupiah and foreign currency denominated debts of all domesti-
cally incorporated banks.167  This guarantee was substantially
162 See Daniel Moss & Christopher Donville, Asia Lurches Toward Banking
Reform as Economic Miracle Fades, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Nov. 13, 1997, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Allbbn File.
163 Id.
164 See, e.g., Goeltom Interview, supra note 62 (describing her opinions on
the effects of Bank Indonesia's actions); Claire Low et al.,IncLonesia's BCA Faces
Run; Speculation of Liem Death Denied, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Nov. 14, 1997,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Allbbn File (reporting on bank runs at two
branches of Bank Central Asia).
165 See Alistair Hammond, Indonesian Central Bank Governor Says No More
Bank Closures, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Nov. 3, 1997, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Allbbn File. On later attempts by Bank Indonesia to maintain confi-
dence in the banking sector, see Bank Indonesia, Press Release on BI Rebuttal on
Rumors (visited Feb. 4, 1999) < http://www.bi.go.id/intl/press/3017pr997
.htm>.
166 See Waking Up, supra note 19.
167 See Republic of Indonesia Presidential Decree No. 26/1998, Jan. 26, 1998
(concerning the Guarantee of Commercial Bank Obligations). Separate from
the guarantee program, in July and August 1998, the Indonesian government
carried out an exchange offer of certain foreign currency denominated debt of
the Indonesian banks. Under the exchange offer, foreign creditors were per-
mitted to exchange eligible Indonesian ban debt 
for new loans guarantee by
Bank Indonesia. Approximately US$2.7 billion of debt was tendered in the
exchange offer. See Minerva Lau & Chris McAllum, Indonesia Pushes Forward
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more comprehensive than the limited deposit protection scheme
that was introduced in connection with the liquidation of the six-
teen banks in November 1997. The guarantee extended to depos-
its and most types of creditor claims, other than subordinated
loans and debts to shareholders or affiliated entities, including
debts incurred by banks' overseas branches.16 Intended as a rela-
tively short-term measure to restore confidence in the banking
sector, the guarantee was due to expire on January 31, 2000.",
The Indonesian government announced that at that time the
guarantee could be replaced, in part, by a deposit insurance
scheme.
1 70
Banks subject to the guarantee program were required to pay
a semi-annual guarantee fee to the Indonesian government.17 ' The
government set the amount of the initial guarantee fee for each
bank at 0.25% of the bank's average monthly amount of the debts
guaranteed under the program." The obligation to pay the fee
was secured by a kind of lien on each bank's assets in favor of the
government; thus, banks were restricted from paying any cash
dividends to their shareholders unless they were current with all
of their payment obligations to the government, including guar-
antee fees.17 ' To prevent an uncontrolled increase in the amount
of debts subject to the guarantee, Bank Indonesia also placed re-
strictions on credit growth and set weekly ceilings on the maxi-
mum interest rates that banks could pay on deposits."
On January 27, 1998, in addition to the guarantee program,
the Indonesian government also announced the creation of a new
Restructuring, 1242 INT'L FiNANCING REv. 77, 77 (1998); Bank Indonesia, In-
donesian Interbank Exchange Offer Expected to Proceed on Schedule, BLOOMBERG
NEWS, Aug. 13, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allbbn File; Robert
Rice, The International Rescue Packagers, FiN. TIMEs, Aug. 4, 1998, at 13.
168 See Bank Indonesia, Implementing Guidelines for the Government Guar-
antee Program on Commercial Bank Obligations, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Mar. 6,
1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allbbn File [hereinafter Bank Guar-
antee Implementing Guidelines].
169 See id.
170 See Bank Indonesia, Statement from Bank Indonesia's Governor Soedrad-
jad Djiwandono, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Jan. 27, 1998, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Allbbn File [hereinafter Bank Indonesia January 27 Press Release]; see
also Welcome to Bank Indonesia, supra note 113.
171 See Bank Guarantee Implementing Guidelines, supra note 168.
172 See id.
173 See id.
174 See Bank Indonesia January 27 Press Release, supra note 170.
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regulatory body for the banking industry known as the Indone-
sian Bank Restructuring Agency ("IBRA")." A presidential de-
cree established the IBRA as an independent agency reporting to
the Ministry of Finance, with the intention that it would have a
limited lifespan and would be disbanded once the restructuring of
the country's banking system was deemed complete." 6 The new
agency was staffed primarily by secondees from Bank Indonesia
and the Indonesian Ministry of Finance."n It also appointed the
New York-based investment banks Lehman Brothers and JP
Morgan to act as its advisers." 8
The government gave IBRA a four-pronged mandate. First, it
was assigned overall responsibility for managing the process of re-
structuring the bank sector, including assuming management con-
trol over those banks judged too financially weak to be rehabili-
tated under their existing management." 9 Second, it was put in
charge of administering the government's guarantee program for
bank debts."' Third, it was empowered to establish a separate as-
set management entity to be known as the Asset Management
Unit ("AMU") to take over non-performing assets from banks
that were either to be liquidated or merged into stronger institu-
tions."' Fourth, it was appointed as a kind of collection agent for
the government, with responsibility for collecting from the ma-
jority shareholders of the private banks the amounts that their
banks owed Bank Indonesia in connection with the liquidity sup-
port that they had received.8 2
The establishment of the IBRA was largely a result of pressure
from the International Monetary Fund on the Indonesian gov-
175 See id. The IBRA is known in Bahasa Indonesia as Badan Penyehatan
Perbanken Nasional or the BPPN. For general information on the IBRA, see
IBRA, Who Is IBRA? (visited Jan. 27, 1999) <http://www.indoexchange.com
/bagong/general/bppn/who/tengah.html > [hereinafter Who Is IBRAjJ.
'76 See Republic of Indonesia Presidential Decree No. 27/1998, Jan. 26, 1998
(concerning the Establishment of the Indonesian Bank Restructuring
Agency/IBRA).
177 See Bank Indonesia January 27 Press Release, supra note 170.
178 See IBRA Advisory Mandate, 1242 INT'LFINANCING REV. 78 (1998).
179 See International Monetary Fund, Camdessus Welcomes Indonesia's
Measures, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Jan. 26, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Allbbn File [hereinafter Camdessus Welcomes Measures].
180 See Rice, supra note 167.
181 See Bank Indonesia January 27 Press Release, supra note 170.
182 See Who Is IBRA?, supra note 175.
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ernment to prove that it was making progress on bank reform."'
However, one could interpret the creation of a new regulatory
body for the banking industry as an acknowledgment by the gov-
ernment of both the severity of the problems facing the banking
sector and the failings of Bank Indonesia. Prior to the creation of
the IBRA, Bank Indonesia was the primary supervisory body for
the banking industry."8 4 Bank Indonesia bore much of the re-
sponsibility, therefore, for the government's failure to adequately
supervise the country's banks and the resulting vulnerability of
the banking sector to the Asian financial crisis. Bank Indonesia
also may have been too tainted by allegations of corruption and
general complicity with earlier wrong-doing by the country's
banks to serve as an effective focal point for the reform of the
banking system. 8 '
As part of its supervisory role, the IBRA undertook a review,
in conjunction with Bank Indonesia, of the financial position of
each of the country's banks. 86 Based on that review, it divided
banks that had received substantial liquidity support from Bank
Indonesia, defined as more than 500% of their total equity, into
two categories: Category A and Category B.' Category A banks
had received liquidity support equal to or in excess of 75% of
their total assets and Category B banks had received less liquidity
support than the 75% threshold, but still equal to or in excess of
two trillion rupiah. 8 Category A banks were to be liquidated,
whereas Category B banks were to have their existing managers
replaced by the IBRA until full control over the banks could be
transferred to a state-owned financial institution."9
183 See Witcher, supra note 126; see also Camdessus Welcomes Measures, supra
note 179 (stating the International Monetary Fund's Managing Director's
praise of the program).
184 See Sullivan, supra note 106, at 21.
185 On allegations of corruption involving Bank Indonesia, see, for exam-
ple, Alistair Hammond, Four Former Bank Indonesia Directors Were Fired for
Corruption, BLOOMBERG NEWs, Dec. 27, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Allbbn File.
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Applying such criteria, by August 1998, the IBRA had taken
action against fourteen banks. 9 ' The new agency identified ten
banks as Category A banks and suspended their operations. 9
The assets of those banks were liquidated by transferring deposit
accounts and performing assets to other banks under IBRA ad-
ministration and transferring non-performing assets to the
AMU." The IBRA also identified another four banks, Bank Cen-
tral Asia, Bank Danamon, Bank PDFCI and Bank Tiara Asia, as
Category B banks. The IBRA effectively nationalized the Cate-
gory B banks, by suspending the rights of their shareholders and
officers and assuming management control.'93
The IBRA demanded that the former majority shareholders of
the suspended and nationalized banks pay the government two
separate amounts; first, the outstanding negative balance that
their respective bank had accumulated with Bank Indonesia, and
second, the amount by which their respective banks' intra-group
lending exceeded the affiliate lending limits.'94 In the case of most
of the banks, both amounts were quite substantial. Each of the
banks owed Bank Indonesia more than 500% of its total share
capital.' More than 80% of Bank Umum Nasional's loan portfo-
See Bank Indonesia, Bank Indonesia: Banking Restructuring and Resolu-
tion, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Aug. 23, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Allbbn File.
191 The operations of seven banks, Bank Surya, Bank Subentra, Bank
Kredit Asia (also known as Istismarat), BankPelita, Hokindo Bank, Deka Bank
and Centris International Bank were suspended in April 1998 and the opera-
tions of another three banks, Bank Dagang Nasional Indonesia (known by its
acronym "BDNI"), Bank Umum Nasiona and Bank Modern were suspended
in August 1998. See Bank Indonesia, Bank Indonesia: Banking Restructuring and
Resolution, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Aug. 23, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Allbbn File [hereinafter Bank Indonesia August 24 Press Release]; Indone-
sia: Bank Repayments, supra note 26. On the suspension of the seven banks in
April 1998, see also Ministry of Finance, Announcements: Regulatory Agency
BPPN Invokes Government Guarantee Program to Safeguard Depositors, (visited
Feb. 12, 1999) <http://www.indoexchange.com/bagong/general/bppn/ an-
nouncements/25abtoc.htm> (discussing the freezing of operations of seven
banks and placement of seven others under BPPN management control).
192 See Uncertainty Looms Over Indonesian Banks, supra note 26.
193 See id.; see also S. Karene Witcher & Jay Solomon, Jakarta Takes Over
Much of Bank System, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Aug. 24, 1998, at 1 (discussing the
takeover of the PT Bank Central Asia and other banks).
194 See id.
19 See generally Who Is IBRA?, supra note 175.
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lio, for example, was reported to have consisted of loans made to
affiliated companies.19'
The IBRA used the threat of criminal prosecution to compel
the owners of the suspended and nationalized banks to make the
required payments. 97 The credibility of that threat was rein-
forced by the Indonesian police, which issued an order prohibit-
ing any of the majority shareholders or directors of the banks be-
ing liquidated by the IBRA from leaving the country.198 The
police also named more than twenty executives from the liqui-
dated banks as suspects in a criminal investigation of violations of
the affiliate lending rules.199 Further pressure was provided when
the Indonesian government empowered the IBRA to seize the
personal assets of bank owners who failed to make timely pay-
ments.2°°
The IBRA originally set a deadline of September 21, 1998 for
such payment. 1 However, when the former owners of only
three banks had substantially complied by that date, the deadline
was extended first by one month and then by one year to Sep-
tember 1999.202 Initially, the owners of the failed banks pledged
various assets to the IBRA, such as property and company shares,
rather than cash to fulfill their obligations." The pledged assets
196 See id.
197 See id.
198 See Indonesia: Bank Repayments, supra note 26.
199 See id.; see also Indonesia Detains Two Bankers, supra note 19 (discussing
the banking probe and its effect on certain individuals); Alistair Hammond,
Indonesia Names 29 Bankers as Suspects in Criminal Probe, BLOOMBERG NEWS,
Aug. 19, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allbbn File (discussing those
who were and were not named as suspects). The Indonesian government has
suggested that bank owners who fail to repay the government could be subject
to extremely serious punishments, including sentences of up to twenty years in
prison and the death penalty. See Jason Singer, Indonesia to Use Death Penalty
Against Late Payers, SCMP Says, BLOOMBERG NEWs, Oct. 15, 1998, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Allbbn File.
200 See Indonesia: Bank Repayments, supra note 26; Dan Murphy & Daniel
Moss, Indonesian Gov't Shuts 3 Banks, Seizes 4 Others, BLOOMBERG NEWs, Aug.
21, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allbbn File.
201 See Witcher & Solomon, supra note 193.
202 The banks that reached substantial agreement with the IBRA regarding
the payment of these amounts by the original September 21, 1998 deadline
were Bank Central Asia, BDNI and Bank Surya. See Adam Schwartz, Perils of
Restructuring Indonesia, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 1998, at 8 [hereinafterPer-
ils ofRestructuring].
203 See Jay Solomon, Salim, Gajab Tunggal Agree to Transfer Assets to Pay




included equity holdings in companies in industries ranging from
food to mining to property. °4 Because of the difficulties in evalu-
ating such assets, however, the IBRA announced in late Septem-
ber 1998 that in the future it would accept only cash as pay-
ment.
205
The transfer of assets to the IBRA by the former controlling
shareholders of the liquidated and nationalized banks, together
with the AMU's acquisition of non-performing loans, represented
the transfer of a significant portion of the Indonesian economy
from private to state control.0 6 In addition to holding loans and
other types of traditional banking assets, the government became
a major shareholder in many of Indonesia's largest listed compa-
nies. These holdings included more than ten percent of the shares
of the country's largest automotive parts assembler, Astra Inter-
national, and more than thirty percent of its largest cement pro-
ducer, Indocement. 27 The government acquired such a substan-
tial amount of property in connection with the bank
restructuring process that the question of how best to manage,
and ultimately dispose of, the various assets became a significant
issue for the regulators.0 8
As of October 1998, the government intended to sell many of
the physical assets that it acquired from the failed banks, such as
buildings, company automobiles and office furniture and fixtures,
by means of public auctions.0 9 Disposing of financial assets, such
204 See id.; Indonesian Banks: Repayment Terms, ECONOMIST, Sept. 26,
1998, at 77; Andi Asrun & Dan Murphy, Owners of 14 Indonesian Banks Say
They've Covered Their Debts, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Sept. 21, 1998, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Allbbn File.
205 See Perils of Restructuring, supra note 202; see generally Indonesia Says,
supra note 113 (discussing continuing IBRA bank takeovers and Indonesian ef-
forts to recover money owed by ba'ks).
26 See Witcher & Solomon, supra note 193.
207 Shares in these companies were transferred to the IBRA by the Salim
Group, the controlling shareholders of Bank Central Asia. The government's
30% holdings in Indocement (PT Indocement Tunggal Prakasa) also included,
however, a 20% stake that the government had acquired in 1985 as part of a
government loan package to the company. See Jay Solomon & Richard Bor-
suk, Holding Company to Get Salim Stakes, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 1998,
at 1.
208 See Andi Asrun & Dan Murphy, Owners of 14 Indonesian Banks Say
They've Covered Their Debts, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Sept. 21, 1998, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Allbbn File.
209 See Kate Linebaugh, Indonesia to Auction Bank Assets, ASIAN WALL ST.
J., Oct. 15, 1998, at 3.
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as loans and securities, however, posed more difficult problems,
both with regard to valuing such assets and identifying prospec-
tive purchasers. The types of financial assets held by the govern-
ment were particularly difficult to value because many were non-
performing loans and other types of defaulted debt instruments.21 °
Determining the fair market value of non-performing assets re-
quires an analysis of the probability either that the borrower will
begin to repay or that the holder otherwise will be able to collect
some amount from the borrower by taking enforcement action.
Undertaking such an analysis in Indonesia in 1998 was little more
than guesswork because of the uncertain economic environment
as well as the lack of effective legal methods for creditors to en-
force on payment claims.
The difficulty for the Indonesian government in disposing of
financial assets was further compounded by the general economic
distress in the country caused by the Asian financial crisis. Trad-
ing on the Jakarta Stock Exchange, for example, was generally so
volatile, and volumes were so thin, that it was virtually impossi-
ble for the government to dispose of large blocks of shares with-
out causing a significant decline in their. price. Moreover, In-
donesian companies and wealthy individuals, who would
ordinarily constitute the primary market for domestic Indonesian
assets, generally were too cash poor to make new investments.
The government also faced difficulties selling assets to foreign
investors. 2"3 Although the devaluation of the rupiah made Indo-
nesian assets relatively inexpensive for investors holding relatively
strong currencies, such as U.S. dollars, Japanese yen or German
marks, the problems of determining an accurate value for the
types of financial assets held by the government was particularly
acute for foreigners. 24 The documentation relating to the assets
211 See generally id.
211 See generally Indonesia Exchange Homepage, supra note 26.
212 See generally id.
213 See Anne Segall, City: The Flight of the Humble Rupiah Leaves Asia with a
Nasty Sting, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Feb. 2, 1998, available in 1998 WL 2994240.
214 Although most foreign fund managers did not have the ability to evalu-
ate Indonesian assets, such as non-performing loans, several specialist invest-
ment funds were set up in 1997 and 1998 specifically to take advantage of the
sharp devaluation of Asian assets caused by the Asian financial crisis. These
funds, often referred to as Asian "vulture funds," looked to benefit from the
devalued currencies and distressed market conditions in Asia to purchase assets
at unusually low prices. See, e.g., Greenwich Group Matches U.S. Funds to Hong
[Vol 20:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol20/iss1/1
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generally was written in Bahasa Indonesia and, even more pro-
hibitively for foreign investors, an accurate picture of the finan-
cial health of an Indonesian company was often difficult to obtain
from abroad.
The potential international market for Indonesian assets was
also limited by the fact that many foreign fund managers, insur-
ance companies and other institutional investors were restricted
from purchasing assets that did not have a so-called "investment
grade" credit rating from an internationally recognized credit rat-
ing agency.21 No Indonesian bank or other corporation had an
investment grade rating and, even had the Indonesian government
agreed to guarantee certain assets to increase their marketability,
Indonesia's own sovereign credit rating was well below invest-
ment grade.216
One potential solution to broaden the international market
for Indonesian assets was the use of a financing technique known
as securitization." 7 Securitization involves creating negotiable se-
curities backed by the cashflows from assets that are not them-
selves securities, such as loans, trade receivables and other types of
payment rights."8 In a typical securitization involving loans, a
portfolio of loans is assigned by a bank to a special purpose vehi-
cle.219 The special purpose vehicle raises the funds necessary to
purchase the loans by issuing notes to investors that are backed
by the cashflows on such loans."
Kong Real Estate, BLOOMBERG NEWS, June 26, 1998, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Allbbn File.
215 An investment grade rating is generally recognized to be a rating of
"BBB" from Standard & Poor's Corporation, "bbb" from Moody's Investor
Services, or an equivalent rating from another international credit rating
agency such as Fitch/IBCA, Duff & Phelps or Thomson. See HealthCare
REIT, Inc. Announces Investment Grade Rating by Standard & Poor's, BUS.
WIRE, Feb. 10, 1998, available in LEXIS, Busfin Library, Bwire File.
216 As of October 1998, Indonesia's senior debt was rated "B3" by
Moody's Investor Services and "CCC+" by Standard & Poor's Corporation.
See Asian Capital Markets, MITI-Backed Malaysia Sovereign Bond to Test Water
for Aid Package Financing, EUROWEEK, Dec. 4, 1998, available in 1998 WL
21700758.
217 See, e.g., Jason Singer, For Asia, Securitizations May Be Best Hope: Financ-
ing Business, BLOOMBERG NEWS, May 27, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Allbbn File; John Authers & Richard Walters, Markets, Not Banks, Call
the Shots, FIN. TIMEs, Oct. 12, 1998, at 3.
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Since the notes issued by the special purpose company are
backed by a portfolio of loans made to different borrowers, pur-
chasers of the notes enjoy a greater diversity of risk than if they
had purchased the rights to the cashflows on a single loan. 21 As-
suming the portfolio of underlying loans is sufficiently large and
properly structured, a default by a borrower on any one of the
loans will not have a significant impact on the pay-out on the
notes.' The diversification of risk achieved through securitiza-
tion permits the special purpose vehicle to issue notes that receive
a higher credit rating than the credit rating of any of the individ-
ual borrowers on the underlying loans. '
Although securitization potentially could be used by the In-
donesian government to assist in the disposal of bank assets, a
number of outstanding issues need to be resolved before such a fi-
nancing technique could become an effective tool for the gov-
ernment. One such issue is that international credit rating agen-
cies will only rate the asset-backed notes issued in a securitization
transaction if the local legal system in the country in which the
underlying assets are located is well-developed and rovides a high
degree of certainty with regard to certain matters. 4 Most impor-
tantly, the rating agencies need to be ensured that the transfer of
the assets from the bank to the special purpose vehicle will be
recognized as a true sale under the local legal system so that such
21 See id.
See Europe Develops Taste for Asset-Backed Bonds: Rates of Return,
BLOOMBERG NEWs, Dec. 12, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allbbn
File.
' In a typical securitization transaction, the special purpose vehicle issues
multiple tranches of notes. See Credit Lyonnais to Repackage One Third of
FF124 Billion Loan, BLOOMBERG NEWS, July 3, 1996, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Allbbn File. Each tranche of notes will generally have a differ-
ent credit rating and a different yield. The holders of the highest rated tranche
of notes will be protected from any reduction in the pay-out of their notes
caused by a default of a single borrower on an underlying loan by the existence
of one or more subordinated tranches of notes. Holders of the subordinated
tranches of notes absorb the effect of defaults on the underlying loans up to a
certain set percentage, and, in consideration of their assuming that risk, receive
a higher rate of interest on their notes. See Goldman Sells $1.3 Bln Cmbs, CSFB
Closes $4 Bln Loans, BLOOMBERG NEWS, May 14, 1998, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Allbbn File.
24 See Bank of Ireland Mortgage Bond Won't Spark Surge of U.K. Issues,
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assets will be outside the reach of creditors of the bank.' Legal
certainty on such matters was generally considered to be lacking
in Indonesia because of the unpredictability of the Indonesian
court system.226
Another limitation on the Indonesian government's ability to
use securitization techniques to sell bank assets to foreign inves-
tors was that a portfolio made up entirely of loans to Indonesian
borrowers was unlikely to be viewed by credit rating agencies as
offering sufficient risk diversification to be eligible for a high
credit rating.' Rating agencies were likely to determine, there-
fore, that the occurrence of certain events, such as a collapse of
the Indonesian banking sector, could cause defaults on all, or al-
most all, of the underlying loans. 8 A portfolio subject to such
highly correlated default risk is generally not seen as being suffi-
ciently diversified to permit the creation of highly rated notes in a
securitization transaction. 9
The asset liquidation process was also a politically contentious
issue for the Indonesian government. Most of the owners of the
private banks were members of Indonesia's small, but economi-
cally powerful, ethnic Chinese minority."' The disproportionate
degree of economic power held by the ethnic Chinese minority,
who made up roughly 2% of the country's population, was fre-
' If the transfer of the underlying loans is not deemed a true sale, but
rather is re-characterized as simply a granting by the bank to the special pur-
pose vehicle of a kind of security interest in tie loans, then, if a bankruptcy of
the bank occurs, creditors of the bank may be able to attach thecashflows on
the loans to satisfy their claims against the bank. See Claire A. Hill, Latin
American Securitization: The Case f the Disappearing Political Risk, 38 VA. J.
INT'L L. 293 (1998). In such a case, the pay out on tle notes issued by the spe-
cial purpose vehicle may be reduced if the bank becomes insolvent. See id.
The notes issued by the special purpose company, therefore, will not be enti-
tled to a credit rating higher than the credit rating of the bank that originated
the loans. See id.
16 See 'Money & Power' Often Still Prevail in Indonesia Courts, JAKARTA
POST, Sept. 17, 1998, available in 1998 WL 13122879.
17 See Arshad A. Ahmed, Comment, Introducing Asset Securitization to In-
donesia: A Method in Madness, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 823 (1998).
221 See In Brief, THOMSON'S INT'L BANKING REG., June 1, 1998, available
in 1998 WL 4779713.
'9 See Hill, supra note 225.
23 See Michael Richardson, Critics Take Aim atJakarta's Bank-Bailout Plan,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 5, 1999, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Iht
File.
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quently criticized by ethnic Indonesians."1 The government was
faced by demands from certain populist political groups to use the
large scale nationalization of bank assets as an opportunity to re-
distribute wealth from the ethnic Chinese business community to
ethnic Indonesians. 2
In addition to liquidating the weakest banks and managing the
asset liquidation process, the IBRA worked to reduce the total
number of small, poorly capitalized banks in the country by
promoting bank mergers. 33 The IBRA was assisted in this regard
by a special intra-governmental unit created by Bank Indonesia to
facilitate bank mergers and other types of consolidations by re-
ducing the time and cost involved in obtaining government ap-
provals. 4 By October 1998, the most significant merger to have
been announced was a combination involving five of the state-
owned banks, Bank Ekspor-Impor, Bank Bumi Daya, Bank Da-
gang Negara, Bapindo and the corporate business of Bank Rakyat
Indonesia."
The merger plan for the five banks called for the banks to
continue operating under their own names, but under common
control of a single senior management, until their operations
could be fully merged over the next two years into a new institu-
tion to be known as Bank Mandiri. 36 During that two year pe-
riod, the non-performing assets of each of the five banks would be
transferred to the AMU. 7 The Indonesian government also in-
231 See id.
232 See Schwartz, supra note 202.
13 See Reform Is Crucial, ASIAWEEK, Jan. 8, 1999, at 65, available in LEXIS,
Asiapc Library, Asiawk File.
234 The unit was composed of representatives from Bank Indonesia, the
De artment of Finance, the Department of Justice, the Department of Home
Agairs and the IBRA. See Bank Indonesia, Formation of Merger, Execution, Con-
solidation and Acquisitions of Public Bank Co-ordinating Team, (last modified
Apr. 30, 1998) < http://www.bi.go.id/intl /press/bi3lprl2.htm >.
235 See Bank Indonesia August 24 Press Release, supra note 191. With its cor-
porate business transferred to the new Bank Mandiri, Bank Rakyat Indonesia
was to be reconstituted as solely a rural development bank. See also Murphy &
Moss, supra note 200.
236 See Bank Indonesia, Muljohardoko Appointed President Director of PT
Bank Mandiri, BLoOMBERG NEWS, Oct. 2, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Allbbn File.
237 See Indonesia: Mar'ie Muhammad Appointed Chief Commissioner 9f Bank





tended to inject fresh capital into Bank Mandiri so that the new
bank could emerge as a financially strong institution capable of
being a leading bank in the restructured Indonesian banking sys-
tem.
238
The IBRA's responsibility for restructuring the banking sec-
tor also included implementing, together with Bank Indonesia, a
recapitalization program for the banks that met certain minimum
financial soundness criteria."' Under the recapitalization pro-
gram, all banks with a capital adequacy ratio of between 4% and
negative 25% were required to provide Bank Indonesia with a
business plan detailing their proposals for raising additional capi-
tal, either from existing shareholders or new investors.' Based
on those business plans, as well as audits of the banks undertaken
by Bank Indonesia, the government would determine whether it
believed that a bank's recapitalization plan was feasible.241 Banks
whose business plans were deemed feasible would then be eligible
for a temporary injection of government funds from the IBRA
while they undertook the private capital raising efforts detailed in
their business plans.242
The Indonesian government was also under pressure from the
International Monetary Fund to improve its prudential supervi-
sion of the country's banks.243 In response to such pressure, the
Indonesian government began to examine ways to raise the qual-
ity of its banking supervision to be closer in line with interna-
238 See Bank Indonesia August 24 Press Release, supra note 191; Indonesia:
Bank Repayments, supra note 26; see also Jason Singer, Indonesia Bets on 'Bullet-
proof Superbanks to Rebuild Economy, BLOOMBERG NEWS, July 17, 1998, avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library, Allbbn File. The Indonesian government's
hopes for the new Bank Mandiri were expressed in its name, which means
"se f-reliant bank" in Bahasa Indonesia.
239 See Program for Rehabilitation of Indonesian Banks, JAKARTA POST, Jan.
28, 1998, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Jkpost File.
.4 See Indonesia: Bank Repayments, supra note 26. Banks with capital ade-
quacy ratios below negative 25 were to be liquidated or merged with other in-
stitutions. See Alistair Hammond, Indonesia -Tells Banks to Recapitalize or Face
Gov't Takeover, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Sept. 29, 1998, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Allbbn File. On the recapitalization program generally, see Bank In-
donesia and National Private Banks Association Discuss the Banking Re-
Capitalization Program (visited Jan. 20, 1999) <http://www.bi.go.id/intl/
press/pr31-24.htm > [hereinafter Banking Re-Capitalization Program].
241 See Banking Re-Capitalization Program, supra note 240.
242 See Bank Indonesia August 24 Press Release, supra note 191.
143 See Christopher Tacchio, IMF, World Bank Say They Expect Action from
Indonesia, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 6, 1998.
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tional standards.2' In particular, the government focused on in-
creasing the frequency and completeness of financial disclosure by
banks in order to enable regulators, as well as the public, to make
a more accurate assessment of a bank's financial condition and
performance."a In early 1998, for example, Bank Indonesia began
requiring banks to submit monthly reports setting out their capi-
tal adequacy ratio and details of their current liquidity position.46
Undertaking such reforms, however, required the Indonesian
government to strike a delicate balance. The government had be-
come aware by events in November 1997 of the inherent danger
in pursuing structural reform in an unstable environment.24 Its
decision at that time, based on International Monetary Fund ad-
vice, to close sixteen banks had backfired, further weakening pub-
lic confidence in the banking system and leading to increased de-
positor withdrawals at many private banks. 48 The economic
244 One common international standard was set out in the Core Principles
of Effective Banking Supervision published by the Bank of International Set-
tlements. See Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, Core Principles of Ef
fective Banking Supervision, Sept. 1997, available in BIS Homepage, supra note
126. But see J. Soedradjad Djiwandono, The Need for International Standards
and Harmonization ofPrudential Arrangement: An Emerging Market perspective,
available in Bank Indonesia Homepage, supra note 6 (discussing the incompati-
bility of certain Bank of International Settlements' standards with the level of
development of banking institutions in emerging market countries).
245 See Welcome to Bank Indonesia, supra note 113.
246 See id. The dependence of many of the country's banks on liquidity
support in the wake of the Asian financial crisis provided Bank Indonesia with
additional leverage to enforce the heightened prudential standards. For exam-
ple, in March 1998, Bank Indonesia issued a decree setting out penalties, in the
form of increased interest rates charged for use of the SBPU and SBI discount
facilities, for banks that were in violation of the minimum statutory reserve
requirement or had negative balances with Bank Indonesia. See Decree of the
Board of Directors of Bank Indonesia on Discount Facilities, Sanctions for Viola-
tions of the Minimum Statutory Reserves in Rupiah and Sanctions for the Negative
Account Balances at Bank Indonesia (visited Jan. 20, 1999) < http://www.bi.go.
id/intl/circular/sk9830271.htm >.
247 See Aleksius Jemadu & Duncan McCargo, Learning Lessons from Thai-
land, JAKARTA POST, Apr. 15, 1998, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Jkpost
File.
248 For a criticism of International Monetary Fund policy in Indonesia and
other countries affected by the Asian financial crisis, see Lucy Conger, Whither
the IMF?, BLOOMBERG MAG., Oct. 1998, at 35; Devesh Kapur, The JME" A Cure
or a Curse, FOREIGN POL'Y, July 1, 1998, at 114; David E. Sanger & Richard
W. Stevenson, Second-Guessing the Economic Doctor, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1998,
§3, at 1; Jeffrey Sachs, Power Unto Itself, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1997, at 21. For




damage caused by that policy decision highlighted for the gov-
ernment the risks of pursuing rapid financial reform without first
establishing stable financial institutions.249
Indonesian banks suffered such poor financial health that the
government also risked precipitating a system-wide collapse if it
suddenly imposed strict standards that only a few of the strongest
banks could meet. The government, in fact, relaxed requirements
in certain areas to lessen the pressure on otherwise viable banks
that temporarily were unable to meet certain prudential stan-
dards.2 0 In June 1998, for example, Bank Indonesia decreased its
capital adequacy ratio targets for banks in the years 1998, 1999,
and 2000. The Bank implemented the decrease to reflect the de-
cline in capital ratios experienced by most of the country's banks
due to the steep fall in the value of the rupiah.21' The revised tar-
get of 4% for 1998 was only half of the minimum capital ade-
quacy ratio advised by the Bank of International Settlements and
ranked among the lowest capital adequacy requirements set by
any of the world's central banks.5 2
Reforming World Finance: Lessons from a Crisis, ECONOMIST, Oct. 3, 1998, at
23.
249 See Jemadu & McCargo, supra note 247.
20 See P. Parameswaran, Indonesian Central Bank Chief Rosy About Rupiah
Despite Rate Cuts, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Oct. 14, 1998.
251 A bank's capital adequacy ratio is calculated by dividing the amount of
its capital by the amount of its risk-weighted assets. See Indonesia Says, supra
note 113 (describing a capital adequacy ratio as "a measure of loans to cash").
The principle behind the capital adequacy ratio is that each asset held by a
bank should be backed by a certain amount of capital, depending on the im-
plied risk of such asset. See Govt to Close More Banks Later This Month,
JAKARTA POST, Feb. 5, 1999, available in LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Jkpost File.
The devaluation of the rupiah caused a sharp decline in the capital adequacy
ratios of most Indonesian banks because certain assets of the banks were de-
nominated in U.S. dollars and other foreign currencies while their capital was
denominated in rupiah. As a result, in rupiah terms, the size of their existing
assets increased purely because of the eff6ct of the changes in the foreign ex-
change rate. Bank Indonesia set 10% as the target for the period between Oc-
tober 1997 and September 1999, and 12% as the target thereafter. See Banking
Policies in Indonesia (visited Jan. 19, 1999) <http:/fwwww.bi.go.id/intl/policies
/bankingpolicy.htm>. The bank lowered the targets in June 1998 to 4%, 8%
and 10% for 1998, 1999 and 2000, respectively. See Indonesia: Bank Repay-
ments, supra note 26; Alistair Hammond & Dan Murphy, Indonesia Cancels
Minimum Capital Plan for Banks, BLOOMBERG NEWS, June 19, 1998, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Allbbn File [hereinafter Minimum Capital Plan].
252 See Indonesia Says, supra note 113. For a general discussion of the Bank
of International Settlements' capital adequacy ratio policy see George Melloan,
1999]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J Int'l Econ. L.
Moreover, the Indonesian government assumed a high degree
of direct control over the banking industry in the wake of the
Asian financial crisis. The government, therefore, had less imme-
diate need to strengthen prudential banking regulations since it
was controlling most of the country's banks through more direct
means.253 In mature economies with well-developed financial in-
stitutions, regulators may be able to maintain stability in the
banking sector during times of economic distress purely by rely-
ing on heightened supervision of bank activities and increased en-
forcement of prudential banking standards.5 4 Indonesia, how-
ever, did not have such a mature economy."5 The severity of the
problems in the Indonesian banking sector brought on by the
Asian financial crisis and the overall weakness of the country's
banks forced the government to look beyond regulatory solutions
and intervene directly in the market to prevent a system-wide col-
lapse.5 6
The Indonesian government took such far reaching direct
measures to stabilize the banking industry that its actions
amounted to a quasi-nationalization of the banking system.25 ' Al-
though the IBRA only identified four banks as completely na-
tionalized "Category B" banks by October 1998, the Indonesian
government assumed a high degree of direct control over the
other private banks as well.25 8 The bank debt guarantee and bank
recapitalization programs, for example, put significant areas of
bank management, including such basic functions as setting de-
posit rates and determining credit growth, under government
administration.5 9
The Indonesian government intended its nationalization of
much of the banking industry to be a temporary response to the
banking crisis.260 Once the banking sector and the general econ-
omy became more stable, the government planned to re-privatize
Maybe a More Modest Global 'Architecture' Is Needed, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Oct.
20, 1998, at 12.




25 See id. ("Nationalizing most of the industry 'is a done deal .....
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a number of the banks that had been put under IBRA control.261
The government also considered the eventual privatization of the
state-owned banks, including the newly created Bank Mandiri.262
Similarly, assuming that purchasers could be found, the govern-
ment intended to sell to the private sector most of the assets that
it acquired in connection with the liquidation of the failed
banks.263
Although limited in scope and intended only as an interim so-
lution, the nationalization of much of the banking sector none-
theless represented a significant change from the government's
banking policies for most of the previous ten years. From the
1988 banking package to the onset of the Asian financial crisis in
1997, the Indonesian government's deregulation of the country's
banking industry had been based largely on orthodox free-market
economic principles.2 6 ' The government opened the industry to
increased private competition, reduced the traditional advantages
enjoyed by state-owned institutions, and generally moved to
permit market forces, rather than government decrees, to deter-
mine basic banking policies, such as the setting of deposit rates
and the allocation of loans. 6
Viewed from the perspective of free-market economic theory,
the Indonesian government's banking liberalization program was
the correct policy course. 67 The response of the international fi-
nancial community to the reforms reaffirmed the correctness of
the government's policies.2 6 1 Multi-national organizations, such
as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the
Asian Development Bank, as well as many leading private sector
financial institutions, including foreign commercial and invest-
261 See id.
262 The Indonesian government appointed Germany's largest commercial
bank, Deutsche Bank, to advise it on the management of BankMandiri and to
formulate a plan for its eventual privatization. See Lau & McAllum, supra note
167; Indonesia: Bank Repayments, supra note 26.
263 See generally Who Is IBRA?, supra note 175.
264 See generally Jay Solomon, Indonesia Shuts 38 Banks in Sweeping Action;




267 See Indrawati & Wardono, supra note 26 (discussing the "virtual sound-
ness" of the government's banking reforms).
268 See Solomon, supra note 264, at A13.
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ment banks, fund management companies and other institutional
investors, rewarded Indonesia for its liberalization efforts by mak-
ing a great deal of financing available to the Indonesian banking
sector.269
The pace of the liberalization program, however, far exceeded
that of the development of banking institutions in Indonesia.'
Few of the country's banks possessed sufficiently developed risk
management or other control systems that would permit the
banks to operate safely in a deregulated environment." This lack
of effective internal controls, combined with the government's
failure to adequately supervise the banks' operations and ensure
compliance with prudential standards, resulted in banks engaging
in the types of high risk practices described in the previous sec-
tion of this Article. ' 2 The unsound lending practices in turn re-
sulted in banks accumulating high levels of non-performing loans
that left the banks very vulnerable to the economic shocks of the
Asian financial crisis?"3
The lesson that the Indonesian government appeared to learn
from the banking crisis is that liberalization should follow, not
precede, the development of financially strong institutions and a
sound framework of prudential supervision. That lesson influ-
enced the government's decision in 1998 to nationalize much of
the banking system until market conditions stabilized.' 4
Nationalization of banks reversed the Indonesian govern-
ment's decade-long policy of deregulating the banking system and
reducing direct state involvement in the bank market. Although
the international financial community generally supported the
earlier liberalization policy, including multi-national institutions
such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund,
the policy proved itself incapable of producing a financially sound• " 271
banking system resilient to external shocks. In light of this his-
tory, the Indonesian government's decision to suspend its faith in
free-market economic theory and assume direct government con-
269 See id.
270 See generally Who Is IBRA?, supra note 175.
271 See id.
272 See supra Section 3.
273 See generally Who Is IBRA?, supra note 175.
4 See Solomon, supra note 264.
275 See generally Who Is IBRA?, supra note 175.
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trol over much of the banking industry can be seen as a natural
response to the Asian financial crisis.
5. CONCLUSION
The Asian financial crisis devastated the Indonesian banking
sector. After a decade in which both the number of banks and
the total amount of outstanding bank credit had expanded annu-
ally, the Asian financial crisis significantly damaged the financial
health of all of the country's banks and caused an overall contrac-
tion of the banking industry. 6 By October 1998, a governmental
decree liquidated twenty-six banks, more than half of the loans in
the banking system did not perform,' 7 and either the IBRA or
Bank Indonesia directly controlled roughly seventy percent of the
total assets held by the country's banks. 8
The banking sector in many other Asian countries also suf-
fered from liquidity shortages and escalating levels of non-
performing loans during the Asian financial crisis. 9 Many of the
weaknesses of the Indonesian banking system, such as poor regu-
latory supervision, a lack of bank transparency,28 and excessive
short-term, unhedged foreign currency borrowing, were common
throughout the region.281 In particular, banks in South Korea,
Malaysia and Thailand experienced problems similar to those in
Indonesia and required significant levels of governmental support
to survive the crisis.282
276 See generally id.
27 In October 1998, the Asian Wall Street Journal estimated that 75% of
the loans in the Indonesian banking sector were non-performing. See Darren
McDermott, Hints of a Recovery in Asia Stir Debate over Readiness: How Much
Suffering Will Heal a Sick Economy?, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Oct. 22, 1998, at 1.
278 See Indonesia Says, supra note 113.
" See McDermott, supra note 277.
280 The Bank of International Settlements defines "bank transparency" as
"public disclosure of reliable and timely information that enables users ofthat
information to make an accurate assessment of a bank's financial condition and
performance, business activities, risk profile and risk management practices..
Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, The Basle Committee Issues Guidance
on Bank Transparency (last modified Sept. 22, 1998) <http://www.bis.org
/press/index.htm >.
281 See Shirazi, supra note 16.
282 Two other Southeast Asian countries whose currencies were affected by
the Asian financial crisis, the Philippines and Singapore, had relatively strong
banking systems and did not experience problems to the degree seen in Indone-
sia, Thailand, Malaysia and South Korea. For a discussion of the effect of the
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In South Korea, for example, because of the extremely tight
liquidity conditions prevailing in late 1997 and early 1998, many
of the country's banks encountered difficulty refinancing their
maturing obligations.283 To avoid widespread bank defaults, in
March 1998, the government offered to guarantee the short term
debts incurred by South Korean banks.284 The guarantee was
provided in the form of an exchange offer under which creditors
were permitted to exchange short-term bank debt for newly is-
sued one, two and three-year government guaranteed loans.85
The Indonesian government later used this exchange offer in June
and July 1998 as the model to carry out a similar bank debt ex-
change program. 2" The South Korean government also set-up a
company called the Korea Asset Management Corporation to ac-
quire non-performing loans from banks.87
Likewise, serious bank liquidity problems and a large number
of bad loans in Malaysia and Thailand caused the governments of
those two countries to undertake bank restructuring programs.2 8
As in Indonesia, the Malaysian and Thai governments aimed to
foster consolidation in their banking markets through mergers
and liquidations of weak banks, to strengthen the capital base of
the surviving institutions and to create a mechanism for the dis-
posal of non-performing loans.289 To manage the bank restructur-
crisis on the Philippines' banking sector, see, for example, Real Crisis, supra
note 36, at 46-47. For a discussion of the effect of the crisis on the Singapore
banking sector, see, for example, Richard Borsuk & Roger Malone, Singapore's
Banks Called Sound, Despite Asian Crisis, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Aug. 25, 1998, at
3.
283 See Bank of Korea Homepage (last visited Feb. 3, 1999) < http://www.
bok.or.kr>.
284 See id.
285 See Bill Austin & Yoolim Lee, S. Korea, Creditors Complete $21.37 Bil-
lion Debt Swap, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Mar. 13, 1998, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Allbbn File. The exchange offer covered approximately US$3.7 bil-
lion of South Korean bank debt for the first year. See id.
286 See text supra note 167.
287 See Bank of Korea Homepage, supra note 283.
288 See Philippe Delhaise, Healing Thailand's Banks, ASIAN WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 21, 1998, at 10 (discussing the Thai recapitalization program); Standard &
Poor's, S&P Views First Round of Malaysian Bank Recapitalization Positive,
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Oct. 8, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allbbn
File [hereinafter Malaysian Bank Recapitalizaiton] (discussing the Malaysian re-
capitalization program).
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ing process, the governments of both countries created new enti-
ties similar to Indonesia's IBRA and AMU.290
The Malaysian government established two separate entities in
the form of special purpose limited liability companies. One
company, known as Danamodal, received a mandate similar to
the IBRA to manage the overall restructuring process and admin-
ister the government's recapitalization of the banking sector.291
The other company, known as Danaharta, undertook an equiva-
lent role to the AMU to acquire non-performing loans from
banks.292 By October 1998, Danamodal had selected ten Malay-
sian banks and finance companies to be recapitalized with, in the
aggregate, the Malaysian ringgit equivalent of approximately
US$850 million,293 and Danaharta had purchased a portfolio of
nonperforming loans from Sime Bank and a delinquent property-
related loan from a Malaysian merchant bank.294
In October 1997, the government of Thailand established an
agency to manage the bank restructuring process, known as the
Financial Sector Restructuring Authority, 95 as well as a state-
owned asset management company to acquire loans from banks
291 See Delhaise, supra note 289.
291 Danamodal's full legal name is Danamodal Nasional Berhad. See Details
on Establishment of Danamodal Nasional Berhad (last modified Aug. 4, 1998)
< http://www.bnm.gov.my> (discussing the creation of Danamod-al).
292 Danaharta's full legal name is Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Berhad.
See Danaharta, Asset Management Company Details Announced (visited Jan. 28,
1999) <http://www.danarta.com.my/public/asset.html> (discussing the
creation of Danaharta); see also Danaharta's Acquisition Approach (visited Jan.
28, 1999) <http://www.danharta.com.my/public/approach.html> (reporting
that Danaharta's strategy involved acquiring non-performing loans with a
minimum principal amount of RM5 million in consideration or government
guaranteed bonds that it would issue).
293 See Managing Director Azman Yahya, Acquisition Agreement Between
Danaharta and Eleven Financial Institutions (last modified Nov. 11, 1998)
< http://www.danharta.com.my/public/acquisition.html >.
294 See Chairman Yabhgm Raja Tun Mohar Raja Badiozaman, Chairman's
Statement on Agreement Between Sime Bank Berhad, Pengurusan Danaharta Na-
sional Berhad and Bank Negara Malaysia (visited Jan. 21, 1999)
< http://www.danharta.com.myfpublic/sime.html >; T.H. Chan, Danaharta
to Manage 6 Bln Ringgit in Sime's Bad Loans, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Oct. 16, 1998,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Allbbn File; see also Peter Montagnon &
Sheila McNulty, Malaysian Banks Ordered to Lend and Lend, FIN. TIMES, Oct.
7, 1998, at 4.
295 See King Bhumibol Adulyadej, Emergency Decree on Financial Sector Re-
structuring B.E. 2540 (last visited Jan. 21, 1999) <http://www.bot.or.th
/govnr/public/news/ae.htm >.
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being liquidated.296 In general, the Thai government planned to
restructure the banking sector by injecting cash directly into the
country's strongest banks by purchasing preference shares and
subordinated debt from them in exchange for government guar-
anteed bonds. Other banks that were not sufficiently sound
enough to merit recapitalization with government funds were to
be merged or liquidated, with their assets transferred either to the
asset management company or to the state-owned Krung Thai
Bank.
297
As the experience of South Korea, Malaysia and Thailand il-
lustrate, the problems experienced by the Indonesian banking sec-
tor during the Asian financial crisis, as well as the types of re-
sponsive remedial action by the government, were not unique. A
number of factors, however, differentiate the banking crisis in In-
donesia from those in the other affected Asian countries. One
such factor was the sheer number of banks involved. At the onset
of the Asian financial crisis, Indonesia had over 230 banks.298 In
contrast, there were only fifteen commercial banks in Thailand
296 See King Bhumibol Adulyadej, Emergency Decree on the Asset Manage-
ment Corporation B.E. 2540 (last visited Jan. 21, 1999)
<http://www.bot.or.th/govnr/public/news/be.htm>. In August 1998, the
government also established rules to facilitate the creation of private asset man-
agement companies to purchase bank assets. See Joint Statement by the Ministry
of Finance and the Bank of Thailand: Financial Sector Restructuringfor Economic
Recovery, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Aug. 14, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Allbbn File; see also Bank of hailand Homepage Regulations for Debt Re-
structuring and Collateral Apraisal (last visited Feb. 3, 1999)
< http://www.bot.or.th/fsupv/piblic/cdraco/frame.htm >.
297 Krung Thai Bank was 80% owned by the Thai government. See Lee J.
Miller, Krung Thai Bank to Overhaul Loan Approval System, Chairman Says,
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Sept. 2, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allbbn
File. As of October 1998, the government had usedKrung Thai Bank to ab-
sorb the assets of two liquidated banks, First Bangkok City Bank and Bangkok
Bank of Commerce. See id. Krung Thai Bank, however, was suffering from a
heavy burden of non-performing assets of its own. See id. As of September
1998, for example, it was reported that 32% of the Krung Thai Banks loans
were delinquent by at least three months. See id. Several analysts expressed
concern that Krung Thai Bank was not sufficiently sound to take on additional
non-performing assets from insolvent banks. See, e.g., Brian Caplen, Which
Banks Will Weather the Storm?, EUROMONEY, Oct. 1998, at 44, 47 (discussing
emerging market bank rating systems as well as Caribbean and Mediterranean
banks that have avoided fallout from global markets); see also Bank of Thai-
land, Restructuring of Krung Thai Bank (last visited Jan. 21, 1999)
< http://www.bot.or.th/fsupv-/public/hotline/eaOO4.doc >.
298 See Foreigners Key to Regional Bank Reconstruction, BUS. DAY (Thai-
land), Jan. 26, 1998, at 4.
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and less than thirty in either Malaysia or South Korea.299 Because
of the large number of banks, the Indonesian government faced a
particularly complicated task in restructuring the banking indus-
try. Indonesian bank regulators were faced, for example, with a
substantially higher number of banks to audit and, ultimately,
many more financially unsound banks to liquidate than were
their counterparts in Thailand, Malaysia or South Korea.
Another factor that distinguished the Indonesian banking sec-
tor from those of the other three countries was that the great ma-
jority of Indonesia's banks were privately held institutions. As of
the beginning of 1998, less than thirty of the country's banks
were listed on a stock exchange, meaning that only a small per-
centage of the banking sector was subjected to the disclosure re-
quirements and market discipline that comes with having publicly
traded shares."° Although poor financial disclosure by banks pre-
sented problems throughout Asia, Indonesia's unlisted private
banks particularly lacked bank transparency. 1 Many Indonesian
private banks, for example, did not release any information re-
garding the performance of their loan portfolios." 2
Indonesian banks also contained much smaller average total
assets than banks in Thailand, Malaysia and South Korea. 3" Al-
though the size of the twenty largest banks in Indonesia was on
par with that of banks in the other three countries, the average
Indonesian bank held only US$500 million in assets." 4 The pro-
liferation of small banks was due principally to the desire of many
Indonesian business groups to maintain an in-house bank.30 ' Be-
cause such banks existed mainly to finance the business opera-
tions of their owners, the funding needs of the affiliated business
299 For statistics on Thai, Malaysian and South Korean banks, seeBank Ne-
gara Malaysia Homeage (last visited Feb. 3, 1999) < http://www.bnm.gov.
my>; Bank of Thailad Homepage (last visited Feb. 3, 1999) <http://www.
bot.or.th> ; Bank of Korea Homepage, supra note 283.
o See Pushed to the Brink, supra note 145.
301 See Standard & Poor's Creditwire Report on Indonesia, supra note 33.
302 See id.
303 See Bank Atlas, supra note 134.
314 See id. In comparison, based on 1997 figures, 12 of the 15 commercial
banks in Thailand had total assets in excess of US$4 billion; the smallest com-
mercial bank in Korea, Kangwon Bank, had assets in excess of US$2 billion;
and none of the top 50% of commercial banks in Malaysia had total assets be-
low US$2 billion. See id.
311 See Top-Level Shakeout, supra note 4, at 55.
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group limited the growth of the bank's assets." 6 As a result, even
viewed in the relatively modest context of Asian banking, many
of Indonesia's banks resembled small curb-side lenders rather than
full-fledged commercial banks.
Despite the extent of the problems afflicting Indonesian
banks, by October 1998, conditions in the Indonesian banking
sector had begun to show signs of stabilizing. Many of the
weaker banks had been liquidated and several others were under
government administration. The Indonesian public also began
regaining confidence in the banking system, evidenced by an ag-
gregate five percent increase in deposits into the private banks in
July and August 1998.07 The increase in deposits, combined with
the generally lower domestic interest rates... and the strengthen-
ing of the rupiah against the U.S. dollar,30 9 reduced the liquidity
pressure on the Indonesian banking sector. 10
Although the Indonesian government succeeded in averting a
system-wide banking collapse, none of the actions the govern-
ment had taken by October 1998 were likely to be sufficient to
cure the fundamental structural problems in the banking sector.
306 In order to maintain their capital adequacy ratios, banks must increase
the amount of capital that they hold each time the size of their assets rises.
Therefore, if the owners of a bank see the primary value of the bank as a fund-
ing source for their own business activities, they will permit the bank's assets
to grow only to the extent necessary to finance those activities. Accumulating
additional assets that are unrelated to the owners' business is generally consid-
ered undesirable because the owners would need to inject additional capital to
support those assets. A privately held bank that has been established as a ca
tive lender for its controlling shareholders will unlikely, therefore, grow moucan
beyond the size required to finance the owners' businesses. See generally Indo-
nesia Detains Two Bankers, supra note 19; Modern Group Pledges, supra note 109.
30 See Alistair Hammond, Deposits at Private Indonesian Banks Up 5.1% in
July, August, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Oct. 12, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Allbbn File.
30 From early September to mid-October 1998, the interest rate on one-
month SBIs declined by approximately 10%. See, e.g., Indonesia to Liquidate 10
Banks Frozen by Restructuring Agency, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 1998, at 3
(discussing Indonesia's plans to liquidate ten banks previously frozen by the
Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency).
309 After reaching a high of USD 1 = BDR 16,150 on June 17, 1998, the
value of the rupiah steadily strengthened against the U.S. dollar from late July
to October 1998. The spot exchange rate was USD = I]DR 13,200 on August
17, 1998 and USD 1 = PDR 7,200 on October 21, 1998. See Bloomberg News
Service, Close/Value (search for Indonesian Rupiah Spot from June 1, 1998 to
Oct. 30, 1998).
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Liquidating insolvent banks, for example, removes the weakest
banks from the industry, but does nothing to strengthen the sur-
viving institutions. Similarly, a merger of several small, finan-
cially weak banks is more likely to create one large, financially
weak bank than a strong institution.11
Even a recapitalization of the banking sector is unlikely to
generate long-term benefits unless the conditions that led origi-
nally to the need for such recapitalization have been removed. In
the case of Indonesia, those conditions were poor regulatory
oversight, a weak regulatory framework and inherent conflicts of
interest of many bank managers. As long as such conditions con-
tinued to exist in the Indonesian banking sector, injecting addi-
tional capital into the country's banks was apt to lead to a repeti-
tion of the problems that the government was seeking to solve.
The most pressing issue, therefore, facing the Indonesian gov-
ernment as of October 1998 was to create a new framework for
the banking sector so that the government could safely lift its
temporary nationalization policy. Without such a framework,
the danger existed that, once re-privatized, the banking sector
would revert to the poor quality of internal management and ex-
ternal supervision that had been present when the government
rescued the industry during the Asian financial crisis. The initial
actions taken by the government to prevent a banking sector col-
lapse, such as guaranteeing bank debts, liquidating and nationaliz-
ing weak banks, promoting bank mergers and formulating recapi-
talization plans, were all, in a sense, simply prepatory work for
the fundamental structural reform of the banking sector that still
needed to occur before it could be returned fully to private con-
trol.312
The Indonesian government took an important first step to-
ward building a new framework for the banking sector with the
Parliament's passage on October 16, 1998 of an amendment to the
31 Similarly, the acquisition of a weak bank by a relatively strong bank
can weaken the acquirer. In 1994, a consortium of three banks, including Bank
Danamon and Bank Central Asia, took control over the insolvent Continental
Bank. Four years later, both Bank Danamon and Bank Central Asia were
taken over by the IBRA. See Bank Central Asia, Danamon, 11 Other Banks Sur-
render Assets to Govt, AFX, Sept. 18, 1998,available in 1998 WL 15898194.
312 See generally Bank Indonesia January 27 Press Release, supra note 170 (dis-
cussing the different steps in the comprehensive rehabilitation of the Indone-
sian banking system).
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Banking Law."' As part of its negotiations with the International
Monetary Fund for financial assistance, the government commit-
ted to revising the Banking Law by the end of 1998.314 These
amendments laid the groundwork for many important regulatory
changes to the banking system.
For example, the amendment rescinded the foreign ownership
limitation in the prior Banking Law which restricted foreign par-
ties from purchasing, in the aggregate, more than forty-nine per-
cent of the shares of a domestically incorporated bank. 1 Because
of the reputation of Indonesian banks for poor management, few
foreign banks had been interested in purchasing a minority stake
in an Indonesian bank. As a result, the restriction against foreign
majority control over a local bank had severely limited the inter-
est of foreign banks in participating in the bank recapitalization
effort in Indonesia.316 The amendment also established the
framework for an insurance scheme of all commercial bank de-
posits and revised a number of prudential regulations. 17 For ex-
ample, in the area of prudential regulations the amendment lim-
ited the definition of bank secrecy in the interest of increasing
bank transparency.318
The Asian financial crisis reversed a thirty year trend of eco-
nomic growth in Indonesia and sent tens of millions of Indone-
sians back into poverty.319 The extent of the decline of the coun-
try's economy was profound. For example, the country's
"' See Indonesia Banks to Be Bolstered by Revised Law, ASIAN WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 19, 1998, at 3 [hereinafterRevised Law].
314 See generally Bank ofSinarMas Group, supra note 108, at 13.
315 See id.
316 For a discussion of the potential interest of foreign banks in purchasing
stakes of Indonesian banks, see Singer, supra note 238; see also, Richard Borsuk,
Indonesia's Bank Bali Seeks Major Foreign Shareholder, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Sept.
17, 1998, at 3.
317 See Revised Law, supra note 313.
318 See id.; see also Indonesia: Bank Repayments, supra note 26. Bank secrecy
provisions had limited the public's ability to obtain all information concerning
the assets and liabilities of the private banks. The amendment limited the types
of information covered by the bank secrecy rules to information regarding de-
positors and their deposits. See id.
319 See, e.g., Jeffrey Wagstaff, Rethinking Asia: Indonesia's Poverty: How Bad
Is It?, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 1998, at S13 (discussing difficulties in gaug-
ing Indonesian poverty levels); Jeremy Pelofsky & Emily Schwartz, Indonesia s
Social Problems Demand Attention, Wolfensohn Says, BLOOMBERG NEws, Mar.
20, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Allbbn File (discussing the need to
address unemployment, hunger, and a rising crime rate).
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nominal gross domestic product per capita was estimated to have
fallen from US$1,155 in 1996 to only US$380 in 1998.320 By re-
establishing a banking system capable of funding economic
growth in the country, Indonesia began the recovery of its econ-
omy. As of October 1998, the Indonesian government's tempo-
rary nationalization of much of the banking sector appeared to
have succeeded in preventing a total banking system collapse.
Significant work remained, however, in order for the government
to establish the foundation for a sound domestic banking system
going forward.
32 See Rethinking Asia: The Search/or Solutions, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Oct.
26, 1998, at S3 (discussing the possibility of debt relief as a solution to Asia's
economic contraction).
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